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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated§ 78A-4-

I 03(2)(j).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the District Court err by not imputing knowledge through the

principal-agency relationship between Theta Investment and its attorneys?
Standard of Review: clearly erroneous; Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d
vJ

305, 312 (Utah 1998), and correctness; State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993).
Issue Preserved at: R. 649, R. 1097, Trial Tr. vol. 2, 81: 11-13, Mar. 31,
2015].

2.

Did the District Court err in determining Theta Investment did not

have notice of the Eskelsens' superior claim?
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Standard of Review: clearly erroneous; Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d
305,312 (Utah 1998), and correctness; State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431,433 (Utah 1993).
Issue Preserved at: R. 2, R. 649, R. 1097, Trial Tr. vol. 2, 78:5-9, 82:19-24,
Mar. 31, 2015.

3.

Did the District Court err in determining the Hansens had authority to

act on behalf of VC Holdings on March 29, 2011?
Standard of Review: clearly erroneous; Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d
305,312 (Utah 1998), and correctness; State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431,433 (Utah 1993).
Issue Preserved at: R. 2.

4.

Did the District Court err in determining the Hansen did not commit a

fraudulent transfer under the Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act?
Standard of Review: clearly erroneous; Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d
305,312 (Utah 1998), and correctness; State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431,433 (Utah 1993).
Issue Preserved at: R. 2, R. 1097, Trial Tr. vol. 2, 104:25 - 107:17, Mar.
31, 2015.

5.

Did the District Court err in determining the Eskelsens had the burden

of disproving Theta Investments defense that it was a bona fide purchaser for
value?
Standard of Review: correctness; State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431,433 (Utah
1993).
Issue Preserved at: R. 1097, Trial Tr. vol. 2, 79:16-23, Mar. 31, 2015.
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6.
vb

Did the District Court err in denying in part the Eskelsens' Motion to

Amend and Make Additional Findings of Fact?
Standard of Review: clearly erroneous; Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d
305, 312 (Utah 1998), and correctness; State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993).
Issue Preserved at: R. 1138.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
There are no constitutional provisions at issue in this appeal.
The following statutes are of central importance to this appeal:

Utah Code Ann.§ 48-2c-802 (repealed 2013) --Agency authority of members and
managers.
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (3), in a member-managed company:
(a) each member is an agent of the company for the purpose of its business;
(b) an act of a member, including the signing of a document in the company name,
for apparently carrying on in the ordinary course of the company business, or
business of the kind carried on by the company, binds the company, unless the
member had no authority to act for the company in the particular matter and the
lack of authority was expressly described in the articles of organization or the
person with whom the member was dealing knew or otherwise had notice that the
member lacked authority; and
(c) an act of a member which is not apparently for carrying on in the ordinary
course of the company business, or business of the kind carried on by the
company, binds the company only if the act was authorized by the other members
in accordance with Section 48-2c-803.
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), in a manager-managed company:
(a) each manager is an agent of the company for the purpose of its business;
(b) a member is not an agent of the company for the purpose of its business solely
by reason of being a member;
(c) an act of a manager, including the signing of a document in the company name,
for apparently carrying on in the ordinary course of the company business, or
business of the kind carried on by the company, binds the company unless the
manager had no authority to act for the company in the particular matter and the
lack of authority was expressly described in the articles of organization or the
person with whom the manager was dealing knew or otherwise had notice that the
manager lacked authority; and
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(d) an act of a manager which is not apparently for carrying on in the ordinary
course of the company business, or business of the kind carried on by the
company, binds the company only if the act was authorized by the members in
accordance with Subsection 48-2c-803(2) or (3).
(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of Subsections (1) and (2), unless the articles of
organization expressly limit their authority, any member in a member-managed company,
or any manager in a manager-managed company, may sign, acknowledge, and deliver
any document transferring or affecting the company's interest in real or personal property,
and if the authority is not so limited, the document shall be conclusive in favor of a
person who gives value without knowledge of the lack of authority of the person who
signs and delivers the document.
Utah Code Ann.§§ 25-6-2, 5, 9- Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act
These sections are attached hereto as Addendum 4.

There are no Rules of central importance to this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case

1.

This appeal asks the Court to determine whether the Trial Court

erred in concluding that the Hansens had authority to transact business on behalf of VC
Holdings. The Eskelsens had previously accepted the Hansens' membership interests in
VC Holdings pursuant to a security agreement and removed the Hansens as managers.
However, thereafter the Hansens sold VC Holdings only asset to Mr. Jennings' company
and absconded with the proceeds making the Eskelsens' security interest worthless.
The Court is also asked to determine if the Trial Court erred by further
concluding the Hansens had authority to act on behalf of VC Holdings without the
Eskelsens' knowledge, when a majority of members was needed to approve a sale ofVC
Holdings' asset because such a sale was outside of the ordinary course of business. Since
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the Eskelsens had foreclosed on the Hansens' membership interests their approval was
necessary for such a transaction.
In the alternative, the Court is asked to determine if the Trial Court erred in
concluding the Hansens did not commit a fraudulent transfer under the Utah Fraudulent
Tran sfer Act.
Finally, this appeal asks the Court to determine whether the Trial Court
erred in concluding that Mr. Jennings, who was manager and/or vice-president of several
involved companies, did not have notice of the Eskelsens' position and therefore he
and/or his companies were bona fide purchasers for value.
2.

Appellants (Plaintiffs in Trial Court), Chad Eskelsen and Loma

Eskelsen, (hereinafter referred to as "Eskelsens") are individual residents of Washington
County, State of Utah.
3.
vi

The Appellee (Defendant in Trial Court), Vaughn L. Hansen, was an

individual resident of Sevier County, State of Utah.
4.

The Appellee (Defendant in Trial Court), Carolyn S. Hansen, was an

individual resident of Sevier County, State of Utah.
5.

The Appellee (Defendant in Trial Court), VC Holdings, LLC,

(hereinafter referred to as "VC Holdings") is a limited liability company under the laws
vJj

of the State of Utah. VC Holdings was founded by the Hansens, but taken by the
Eskelsens in about January of 2011, in satisfaction of a debt. VC Holdings joins the
Appellants in this brief.
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6.

The Appellee (Defendant in Trial Court), Theta Investment

Company, (hereinafter referred to as "Theta Investment") is a corporation under the laws
of the State of Utah. Mr. Gilbert Jennings was the vice-president during the transactions
relevant to this case.

Course of Proceedings/Disposition in District Court
7.

The Eskelsens filed a Complaint for Declaratory Relief on June 29,

8.

Theta Investment Company filed an Answer and Counterclaim and

2012. [R. 2].

Cross-Claim on September 4, 2012. [R. 120].
9.

The Eskelsens, on behalf of themselves, filed a Reply to

Counterclaim and Cross-Claim on September 26, 2012. [R. 135].
10.

The Eskelsens, on behalf of VC Holdings, filed a Reply to Cross-

Claim on October 12, 2012. [R. 143].
11.

VC Holdings filed an Answer to Complaint for Declaratory Relief

and Cross-Claim on July 2, 2013, including cross-claims against Theta Investment for
Quiet Title and Unjust Enrichment. [R. 237].
12.

Theta Investment filed an Answer to VC Holdings' Cross-Claim on

July 8, 2013. [R. 245].
13.

Theta Investment filed a Motion for Summary Judgment Re:

Bankruptcy Issues on February 25, 2014. [R. 378].
14.

The Trial Court entered an Order Denying Motion for Summary

Judgment Re: Bankruptcy Issues on August 11, 2014. [R. 520].
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(11,

15.

Theta Investment sought permission for interlocutory appeal on

September 2, 2014. [R. 528].
16.

The Utah Court of Appeals denied permission for interlocutory

appeal on October 10, 2014. [R. 538].

~

17.

A two-day trial was held on March 30 and 31, 2015. [R. 666, 668].

18.

The Trial Court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

and Order and Judgment on May 11, 2015, concluding the Eskelsens had properly
foreclosed on the Hansens' membership interests in VC Holdings, but the Hansens still
had authority to sell VC Holding's asset because Mr. Jennings did not have notice of their
lack of authority. Further, the Hansens did not commit a fraudulent transfer because the
present situation does not squarely fit within the definitions of the Act. Accordingly, the
Eskelsens were granted no relief. [R. 1101, 1098].
19.

The Trial Court entered a Default Judgment against Vaughn L.

Hansen and Carolyn S. Hansen Re: Plaintifrs Causes of Actions on May 11, 2015, due
to the fact they did not file any Answers or pleadings of any kind. [R. 1129].
20.

The Eskelsen's filed a Motion to Amend and Make Additional

Findings of Fact on May 26, 2015. [R. 1138].
21.

The Trial Court entered Order on Motion to Amend and Take

Additional Findings of Fact and Motion to Extend Time to Serve Memorandum of Costs
on Plaintiff on October 14, 2016. [R. 1235].
22.

The present appeal was taken on November 10, 2016. [R. 1245].
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

1.

On or about January 6, 2005, Vaughn and Carolyn Hansen

(hereinafter "the Hansens") formed a company called VC Holdings, LLC (hereinafter
"VC Holdings"). [Exhibit 26] 1• In June of 2007, the Hansens both became managers of
VC Holdings. [Exhibit 52].
2.

On or about July 31, 2000, Gilbert M. Jennings (hereinafter "Mr.

Jennings") formed JEN CO, LC (hereinafter "JENCO"), and was manager of the same.
[Exhibit 22].
3.

Vaughn Hansen and Mr. Jennings have known each other for over

30 years, first meeting when Mr. Hansen was only 12 years old, and have had ongoing
business relations with each other for many of those years. [R. 1096, Trial Tr. vol. 1,
66:19-67:14, Mar. 30, 2015]. Mr. Hansen also testified that he relied on Mr. Jennings
for financial and legal advice. [Id. at 79:5].
4.

In about 2007, the Hansen and Mr. Jennings agreed their

companies, VC Holdings and JENCO, would purchase real property, a warehouse-type
building, together in the Fort Pierce Industrial Park, St. George, Utah. [Exhibit 14].
5.

The real property, described simply as: "Proposed Lot 158 Fort

Pierce Industrial Park" was purchased in part by each company on August 15, 2007. [Id].

6.

On or about March 24, 2008, VC Holdings and JENCO formed NC

Leasing, LC (hereinafter "NC Leasing"), with VC Holdings owning 31.8% and JENCO
owning 68.2%. [Exhibit 24]. Mr. Jennings was made manager of NC Leasing. [Id].
1

All Exhibits referenced were entered on the Record during the March 30 and 31, 2015, bench trail.
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7.
~

Also on March 24, 2008, VC Holdings and JENCO transferred their

respective interests in the real property to JVC Leasing. [Exhibit 15]. Thus, VC
Holdings owned 31.8% and JENCO owned the other 68.2% of NC Leasing, and NC
Leasing owned the real property.
8.

On or about May 12, 2009, Chad and Loma Eskelsen (hereinafter

"the Eskelsens") loaned the Hansens $120,000.00. [Exhibit 1]. The Hansens executed a
Promissory Note promising to repay the loan on specific terms. [Id].
9.

As security for the loan, the Hansens also executed a Limited

Liability Company Membership Interest Pledge Agreement pledging 100% of the total
issued and outstanding membership interests in VC Holdings to the Eskelsens. [Exhibit

2]. Attorney E. Troy Blanchard of the law firm Durham Jones & Pinegar drafted these
agreements between the Eskelsens and the Hansens. [R. 1096, Trial Tr. vol. 1, 195 :4-17;
198:4-9; 214:25 -215:11, Mar. 30, 2015].
0j)

10.

In about the summer of 2010, the Eskelsens hired an attorney, Daniel

J. Tobler, to pursue the Hansens for failing to repay the loan according to their agreed
upon terms. [R. 1096, Trial Tr. vol. 1, 9:19-10:14, Mar. 30, 2015].
11.

Mr. Tobler was able to contact Mr. Hansen and discuss the default.

[Id. at 10: 15-23]. They discussed the Hansens executing a confession of judgment in lieu
of a lawsuit. Mr. Hansen agreed to the confession, but never followed through. [Id. at
10:24- 11: 10]. Neither the Eskelsens nor their attorney was able to contact the Hansens
after these discussions. [Id].
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12.

On October 28, 2010, the Eskelsens perfected their security interest

with a UCC 1 Filing Statement filed with the Utah Department of Commerce. [Exhibit
35].
13.

On December 30, 2010, Mr. Tobler, on behalf of the Eskelsens, sent

a letter to the Hansens informing them the Eskelsens were proposing to accept their
membership interests in VC Holdings in full satisfaction of the Promissory Note.
[Exhibit 17]. This letter was sent by certified mail, return receipt requested, to P.O. Box
2183, St. George, Utah. [Id.; R. 1096, Trial Tr. vol. 1, 15:10-16, Mar. 30, 2015].
14.

Mr. Hansen testified he does not remember seeing the letter, but

acknowledged it is possible there was a certified mailing notice slip in his P.O. Box and
he never retrieved the letter. [R. 1096, Trial Tr. vol. I, 135: 17-21, Mar. 30, 2015].
15.

This letter also informed the Hansens that the Eskelsens "will be the

sole members of VC Holdings, LLC and, in accordance with their rights as members, will
remove you as members and managers of the same." [Exhibit 17].
16.

Also on December 30, 20 I 0, Mr. Tobler, on behalf of the Eskelsens,

also sent a letter to Mr. Jennings as manager of NC Leasing informing him of the
Eskelsens' proposal to accept the Hansens membership interests and requested "all
notices from NC Leasing, LC, and payments or distributions for VC Holdings, LLC's
31.8% interest in JVC Leasing, LC," be paid to the Eskelsens. [Exhibit 18]. In other
words, nothing should be sent to the Hansens on behalf ofVC Holdings. This letter was
also sent by certified mail, return receipt requested. Id.
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17.

Neither Mr. Tobler nor the Eskelsens received an objection from the

Hansens regarding their proposal to accept the membership interests in VC Holdings. [R.
1096, Trial Tr. vol. 1, 20:4-6, Mar. 30, 2015].
18.

On January 7, 2011, Mr. Tobler received a phone call from Mr.

Blanchard. [Id. at 21: 18-23; Exhibit 6]. Mr. Blanchard stated he was calling as a favor
for the Hansens, but that his firm officially represented Mr. Jennings. [R. 1096, Trial Tr.
vol. 1, 23:2-9, Mar. 30, 2015]. Mr. Blanchard stated he did not believe the Eskelsens had
properly foreclosed the membership interest in VC Holdings, [id.]; however, rather than
dispute this issue, he suggested a potential compromise between the Eskelsens, Hansens,
and Mr. Jennings. [Id. at 25: 1-13]. Mr. Blanchard suggested an agreement to allow Mr.
Hansen to broker a sale of the real property to Mr. Jennings, place the proceeds in
escrow, and then the parties could determine how the proceeds should be distributed. Mr.
Tobler agreed to consult with the Eskelsens and then contact Mr. Blanchard with an
~

answer. [Id. at 28:4-9].
19.

Mr. Tobler testified after this phone call he believed he had made

official contact with both Mr. Jennings' attorney or law firm and unofficially with the
~

Hansens' attorney, [id. at 26:5-8], and that he believed it would not be ethical for him to
contact either the Hansens or Mr. Jennings directly. [Id. at 26:9-15].
20.

Mr. Jennings testified that he worked mostly with attorney Chris L.

Engstrom also of Durham Jones & Pinegar, and that Mr. Blanchard worked with him
directly on at least two other projects. [Id. at 226:17-12; 227:7-15]. Mr. Blanchard also
testified he had worked directly with Mr. Jennings in about early 2011. [M. at 200: 18-22,
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207:15 -208:1]. Mr. Blanchard further testified that he and Mr. Engstrom were both
shareholders at Durham Jones & Pinegar. [Id. at 208:20 - 209:8].
21.

On January 11, 2011, Mr. Tobler received a letter from Mr.

Jennings, dated January 4, 2011, on behalf of JVC Leasing in response to his letter dated
December 27, 2010 (mailed December 30, 2010). [Exhibit 20; R. 1096, Trial Tr. vol. 1,
21 :24 - 22:4, Mar. 30, 2015]. In his letter, Mr. Jennings requests "documentary proof of
the transition of ownership" of VC Holdings. [Exhibit 20]. Mr. Jennings also informed
Mr. Tobler that VC Holdings was "indebted to [JVC Leasing] in the amount of
$54,270.50," and suggests that the Eskelsens "contact me and work out a repayment
plan." [Id]. Mr. Jennings testified he does not know if he sent this letter certified and did
not have a receipt or other proof. [R. 1096, Trial Tr. vol. 1, 239:21 - 240:5, Mar. 30,
2015; R. 1097, Trial Tr. vol. 2, 13:8-13, Mar. 31, 2015].
22.

Mr. Tobler testified he noticed Mr. Jennings' letter was written on

January 4, but not received until January 11, 2010. [R. 1096, Trial Tr. vol. 1, 22:8-23,
Mar. 30, 2015; Exhibit 20]. Because he had already had a telephone conversation with
Mr. Blanchard on January 7, he assumed Mr. Jennings' letter had been written, mailed,
and then Mr. Jennings had spoken to his attorneys who in turn had contacted him. [Id. at
26:21 - 27:4]. Therefore, he did not believe he needed to, or ethically could, respond to
Mr. Jennings letter directly. [Id. at 27:5-11 ].
23.

On January 19, 2011, Mr. Tobler contacted Mr. Blanchard to inform

him that the Eskelsens would agree to the proposed escrow agreement. [Id. at 31 :7-14].
Mr. Tobler understood that all sides, the Eskelsens, the Hansens, and Mr. Jennings,
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would agree to and sign such an agreement. [IQ]. Mr. Blanchard testified this was also
his understanding. [R. 1096, Trial Tr. vol. 1, 194:21 -195:3, Mar. 30, 2015].
24.

On February 22, 2011, Mr. Blanchard sent an email to Mr. Tobler

stating: "I apologize for the delay in getting back to you. It is not Vaughn's fault, but
mine as I have not gotten to the Escrow Agreement yet. I will put together a draft this
week and get it to you. I will also contact the Jennings to confirm they will agree to the
escrow of funds to the extent of any distribution pursuant to the escrow agreement."
[Exhibit 7]. Mr. Blanchard testified that when he wrote that he would "contact the
Jennings" he meant he would talk to Mr. Engstrom, [R. 1096, Trial Tr. vol. 1, 200:11-17,
Mar. 30, 2015], who worked more directly with Mr. Jennings. [Id. at 226:17-12; 227:715].
25.

Mr. Blanchard also testified that he told Mr. Tobler that he would

either consult with Mr. Jennings or Mr. Engstrom about the escrow agreement to ensure it
vJ

was acceptable to the Jennings. [Id. at 189:7-13]. Mr. Blanchard further testified he
believed Mr. Tobler understood that he was working in the same firm that represented
Mr. Jennings and that he would talk with Mr. Engstrom about these matters. [Id. at
190:11 -191:6].
26.

Mr. Blanchard testified that he did have a conversation with Mr.

Engstrom about the escrow agreement and that he was told the Jennings would not have a
problem with it. [Id. at 184:18 -185:2]. Mr. Blanchard also testified that he informed
Mr. Tobler that the Hansens and Mr. Jennings were on board with an agreement. [Id. at
193: 15-22].
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27.

On March 22, 2011, Mr. Blanchard emailed Mr. Tobler to inform

him that he had not yet prepared the escrow agreement, stating Mr. Hansen was working
on a way to make a substantial payment to the Eskelsens. [Exhibit 8]. Mr. Blanchard
also informed Mr. Tobler that "[n]o distribution are being paid out of the LLC, and
haven't been for a long time, and it's unlikely distribution will be made for the
foreseeable future." [Id].
28.

In response, Mr. Tobler stated the Eskelsens would still like to have

an agreement in place: "If nothing else, just as a showing that they are not sitting on their
rights." [Id].
29.

In response to this Mr. Blanchard stated: "If he can't get this all

worked out by next week, then I agree I should just prepare the escrow documents." [Id].
30.

Mr. Blanchard testified that when he sent these emails on March 22,

2011, he did not know of any plan between the Hansens and Mr. Jennings to sell the
property interest at issue in this case. [R. 1096, Trial Tr. vol. 1, 202:23 - 203 :5, Mar. 30,
2015]. Mr. Tobler also testified that he did not understand these emails to mean the
property may be sold. [Id. at 33:14-34:3].
31.

The following day, on March 23,2011, Mr. Engstrom ordered

closing documents from Elwin Prince at Southern Utah Title Company for a transfer of
the 31.8% property interest at issue in this case from JVC Leasing to VC Holdings, and
then from VC Holdings to Theta Investment Company (hereinafter "Theta Investment")
through a 1031 exchange qualified intermediary. [Exhibit 5].
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32.

Mr. Jennings was the vice-president of Theta Investment in early

2011. [Exhibit 44]. Mr. Jennings testified at trial that he is now the president of Theta
Investment as of three or four years ago. [R. 1096, Trial Tr. vol. 1, 221:8-13, Mar. 30,
2015; R. 1097, Trial Tr. vol. 2, I 0: 17-20, 21 :20-23, Mar. 31, 2015]. However, as of
March 30, 2015, he had not changed the Utah Department of Commerce website to
reflect this change. [Exhibit 58].
33.

Between January and March of 2011, Mr. Jennings testified he had

multiple meetings with Mr. Engstrom, and the Eskelsens were discussed in those
meetings. [R. 1096, Trial Tr. vol. 1, 237: 10-24, Mar. 30, 2015; R. 1097, Trial Tr. vol. 2,
18:23 -19:10, Mar. 31, 2015].
34.

On March 29, 2011, the Hansens and Mr. Jennings met Mr. Prince at

Southern Utah Title Company and executed closing documents and agreements
exchanging VC Holdings 31.8% interest in JVC Leasing for a 31.8% interest in the real
property at issue in this case. [Exhibit 39; R. 1096, Trial Tr. vol. 1, 102: 15-19, Mar. 30,
2015]. Then, Mr. Hansen executed a deed transferring the 31.8% interest in the real
property to Theta Investment. [Exhibit 21].
35.

Mr. Hansens testified he did not know which company he had

transferred VC Holding's interest to, other that it was one of the Jennings'. [R. 1096,
Trial Tr. vol. 1, 100:9-14, Mar. 30, 2015]. At trial, he thought it may be JENCO. [Id].
36.

Prior to the sell, Mr. Hansen testified he asked Mr. Jennings

specifically if he had authority to conduct business on behalf ofVC Holdings. [Id. at
104:8-10; 135:22 - 136:5]. He stated Mr. Jennings told him the Eskelsens' claim was not
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valid. [Id. at 105:5-10]. Mr. Hansen stated he would not have participated in the
transaction if Mr. Jennings had told him it was not legal. [Id. at I 05: 11-15]. Conversely,
Mr. Jennings testified it was Mr. Hansen who told him the Eskelsens did not have a valid
claim, [id. at 249:4-7], and that he and Mr. Hansen had several conversations about the
Eskelsens between January and March 2011. [R. 1097, Trial Tr. vol. 2, 7:3-11, Mar. 31,
2015].
37.

Although Mr. Jennings testified he did not know for sure if Mr.

Tobler had received his January 4, 2011, letter, [R. 1096, Trial Tr. vol. 1, 239:21 - 240:5,
Mar. 30, 2015; R. 1097, Trial Tr. vol. 2, 13:8-13, Mar. 31, 2015], he did not send a
second letter or attempted to contact the Eskelsens or call Mr. Tobler directly, [Trial Tr.
vol. 2, 8:20-22, Mar. 31, 2015], he testified he had "exhausted everything I knew what do
to do" to discover if the Eskelsens had a valid claim. [R. 1096, Trial Tr. vol. 1, 241 :7-8,
Mar. 30, 2015].
38.

In exchange for the transfer of the real property interest, Theta

Investment paid $180,000.00 into escrow with Southern Utah Title Company, and NC
Leasing either received $54,000.00 or otherwise considered the $54,270.50 debt that VC
Qb

Holdings owed to JVC Leasing satisfied. [Exhibits 56, 49, 20].
39.

Mr. Hansen testified there was no appraisal of the property interest

at the time of sale, [R. 1096, Trial Tr. vol. 1, 116:2-6, Mar. 30, 2015], and he believed the
value was much higher, at approximately $350,000.00. [Id. at 137:8-11]. Further, he
does not believe the purchase price was for fair market value. [Id. at 138:20 - 139: 1].
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40.

Mr. Jennings also testified there was no appraisal of the property

interest, [id. at 246: 1-4], and the price was reached with the help of a certified public
accountant that gave a range of value from $160,000.00 to $290,000.00. [Id. at 244:1315]. He further testified that there was no back-and-forth negotiation with the Hansens,
and that the final price was reached because that is all Theta Investment had to offer. [Id.
at 245:2-8, 16-21]. He testified he said at the time: "if Vaughn wants to accept that
amount, that's how much money we've got .... " [Id. at 245:5-6].
41.

Mr. Hansen testified he sold the property interest on March 29,

2011, because he was "broke." [Id. at 100:17-20]. Mr. Jennings also testified he knew
the Hansens were in financial trouble. [Id. at 244: 1-2; R. 1097, Trial Tr. vol. 2, 5: 18,
Mar. 31, 2015].
42.

To alleviate some of these financial troubles, Mr. Hansen testified he

wanted to receive distributions from NC Leasing, but Mr. Jennings, as the majority
GIP

owner, overruled his request and elected instead to build a reserve fund. [R. 1096, Trial
Tr. vol. 1, 111:10-16, Mar. 30, 2015].
43.

Mr. Hansen testified the final sale price was determined by Mr.

Jennings who exploited his and his wife's poor financial situation, forcing them to sell
only to Mr. Jennings or one of his companies. [Id. at 101:24-102:3]. Mr. Hansen
testified he had another opportunity to sell the property for $350,000.00, [id. at 101 :6-7];
however, Mr. Jennings told him "we will not have any other partner, do you understand
what I am saying." [Id. at 102:8-12]. After this conversation Mr. Hansen testified he felt
he could not sell to anyone else. [Id.; also at 142:23 - 143:1, 14-20]. Mr. Jennings also
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testified he was aware of another interested party, a Mr. Miller, but after he spoke with
Mr. Miller nothing further developed. [R. 1097, Trial Tr. vol. 2, 33: 22 -35:9, Mar. 31,
2015].
44.

Also on March 29, 2011, Mr. Hansen was asked to sign a Waiver

and Consent acknow!edging the law firm of Durham Jones & Pinegar did not represent
him or VC Holdings in the transaction with NC Leasing and/or JENCO, although the
firm had represented Mr. Hansen and VC Holdings in other matters. [Exhibit 55].
45.

Also on March, 29, 2011, the Hansens instructed Southern Utah

Title Company to release the $180,000.00 sale proceeds to a company called ME Jenkins
Management, LLC, and not VC Holdings. IExhibits 51, 34]. Once paid out, Mr.
Hansens testified he used the money for personal expenses and elected not to pay the
Eskelsens. [R. 1096, Trial Tr. vol. 1, 127:6-11, 127:24-128:1, Mar. 30, 2015]. Mr.
Hansen testified he "decided to do something he thought was wrong and kept it for
himself." [Id. at 128:8-1 O].
46.

Mr. Tobler testified that neither he nor the Eskelsens had any

knowledge of the March 29, 2011, transaction. [Id. at 41:2-10]. On May 4, 2011, Mr.
Tobler contacted Mr. Blanchard to inquire the status of the parties and the escrow
agreement. [Id. at 35: 11-14]. At that time Mr. Blanchard informed him that he had not
had contact with Mr. Hansen for a very long time and it didn't appear there would be any
agreement between the parties. [lg. at 35:20 - 36:7]. Mr. Blanchard also told Mr. Tobler
he was free to contact or otherwise pursue the Hansens. [Id].

Page 22 of 50
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

47.

Mr. Tobler further testified that, besides Mr. Blanchard, no other

attorney from Durham Jones & Pinegar or Mr. Jennings contacted him after January of
2011, regarding this case. [Id. at 36:19-22].
48.

The Eskelsens attempted to locate the Hansens directly after May 4,

2011, with no luck. [Id. at 37:5-16]. They even hired a process server to try to find them
still with no success. [Id].
49.

In about August of 2011, the Eskelsens received notice of the

Hansens' Ch. 7 bankruptcy filing. [Exhibit 29; R. 1096, Trial Tr. vol. 1, 40:14-17, Mar.
30, 2015]. On the same day they received the bankruptcy notice, Mr. Tobler testified he
searched the Washington County, Utah, Recorder's Office website and for the first time
discovered the March 29, 2011, transfer documents and transfer it evidenced. [Id. at
41 :2-1 0].

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The Trial Court erred by treating Mr. Jennings and his attorneys as

autonomous entities rather than one principal-agent entity. By so doing, the Trial Court
allowed Mr. Jennings to claim innocent party (acting without knowledge) status when in
reality his attorneys had full knowledge of the facts and circumstances of this case that
would preclude him or his companies from being innocent parties. The Trial Court also
created an impossible situation for the Eskelsens' attorney wherein he would be required
to unethically communicate directly with Mr. Jennings even after being introduced to his
attorneys. The Trial Court improperly concluded, in part, that Mr. Jennings did not have
notice because the Eskelsens' attorney did not communicate with him directly. Contrary
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to the Trial Court's conclusions, Mr. Jennings should be imputed with the knowledge of
his attorneys.
2.

The Trial Court further erred by concluding Mr. Jennings, and

therefore his companies, did not have notice of the Eskelsens' superior claim. Mr.
Jennings received actual notice via a letter describing the Eskelsens' claim and should be
imputed, as argued above, with all the knowledge his attorneys had through the many
communications they had with the Eskelsens' attorney. All these notice events occurred
between approximately January 1, 2011, and March 29, 2011. Give this short period of
time, Mr. Jennings should have been on inquiry notice requiring him to investigate the
Eskelsens' claims further before being able to claim to be an innocent purchaser. Since
he did not investigate further, he should be further imputed with what knowledge he
would have learned through a proper inquiry.
3.

The Eskelsens properly foreclosed on the Hansens' membership

interests in VC Holdings. The Eskelsens not only took the Hansens' membership
interests pursuant to a security agreement, they also removed the Hansens as managers of
the company. These facts were relayed to Mr. Jennings directly and continually
discussed with his counsel. However, the Trial Court erred by concluding the Hansens
could still transact business on behalf of VC Holdings as of March 29, 2011. Further, VC
Holdings' Operating Agreement requires a majority of members to approve a manager
selling assets outside of the ordinary course business. Thus, even if the Hansens were
still acting as managers ofVC Holdings, they did not have authority to sell VC Holdings'
interest on Mach 29, 2011, without the Eskelsens approval. The Trial Court further erred
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by concluding the Hansens could sell VC Holdings' interest even without the Eskelsens'
CJ>

approval because Mr. Jennings did know this was a problem. As argued above, Mr.
Jennings did have notice.
4.

The Trial Court erred in determining the Hansens' actions did not

amount to a fraudulent transfer under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. The
constructs of the Act should be liberally construed to fit the present situation to afford the
Eskelsens relief. Although the Hansens are the "debtors," and VC Holdings technically
owned the "asset" that was "transferred," by transferring VC Holdings only asset the
Hansens effectively made the Eskelsens' security interest worthless. The Act should be
applied to prevent such an unfair outcome.
5.

The Trial Court erred in determining the Eskelsens had the burden of

~

disproving Theta Investment's affirmative defense. Longstanding law dictates that every
element of a defense must be proven by the party asserting the defense. In the present
case, Theta Investment argues it is a bona fide purchaser for value. However, the Trial
Court improperly placed the onus on the Eskelsens to prove Theta Investment did not pay
fair market value, rather than requiring Theta Investment to prove it did pay fair market
~

value.
6.

The Trial Court erred by denying in part the Eskelsens motion to

amend or make additional findings of fact. The Trial Court made certain material
misstatements in its findings when compared to the trail transcript and documentary
evidence. These misstatements are significant to the issues of notice and should affect
the Court's conclusions.
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ARGUMENT

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT IMPUTING
KNOWLEDGE THROUGH THE PRINCIPAL-AGENCY
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THETA INVESTMENT
AND ITS ATTORNEYS

"The attorney-client relationship is grounded in principles of agency .... "
Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Opinion Committee, 2004 WL 2803335, at *2; see also
Von Hake v. Thomas, 858 P.2d 193, 194 n. 3 (Utah Ct.App.1993) ("[A]n attorney is the
agent of the client and knowledge of any material fact possessed by the attorney is
imputed to the client."), cert. granted, 868 P.2d 95 (Utah 1993), remanded to 881 P.2d
895 (UT App.1994). The Utah Supreme Court has determined that not only does an
attorney have such a relationship with his or her client, but all attorneys in a firm together
have the same relationship:
Where a law firm represents a client, each individual attorney within the
firm generally has an attorney-client relationship with that client. Indeed,
as one court notes, "It is axiomatic that the employment of a law firm is the
employment of all members of that firm unless there is a special
understanding otherwise." Knight v. Guzman; see also Streit v. Covington
& Crowe (stating that "by retaining a single attorney, a client establishes an
attorney-client relationship with any attorney who is a partner of or is
employed by the retained attorney"); Burton v. Estrada ("[W]hen a client
hires an attorney in a partnership the presumption is that he or she has hired
the other attorneys in the firm as well, unless there is an agreement
otherwise.").
Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 37 P.3d 1130, 1147 (2001) (some internal citations
omitted). In the present case, Mr. Blanchard and Mr. Engstrom were partners together in
the law firm Durham Jones & Pinegar during the years 2010 and 2011 and therefore each
had an attorney-client/agency relationship with Mr. Jennings during that time.
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Additionally, any information Mr. Jennings' attorneys learned as his agents would be
imputed to him:
Under longstanding Utah law, "the knowledge of [an] agent concerning the
business which he is transacting for his principal is to be imputed to his
principal." First Nat'/ Bank v. Foote. A principal is imputed with "[a]n
agent's knowledge of matters within the scope of his or her authority
[because] ... it is presumed that such knowledge will be disclosed to the
principal." Macris v. Sculptured Software, Inc. This rule is broad,
encompassing" 'all notice or knowledge relating to the subject-matter of
the agency which the agent acquires or obtains while acting as such agent
and within the scope of his authority.' " Latses v. Nick Floor, Inc.; see also
3 C.J.S. Agency§ 432 (1973) ("[A] principal is affected with constructive
knowledge, regardless of his actual knowledge, of all material facts of
which his agent receives notice or acquires knowledge while acting in the
course of his employment and within the scope of his authority, although
the agent does not in fact inform his principal thereof." (emphasis added)).
Wardley Better Homes & Gardens v. Cannon, 61 P.3d 1009, 1014-15 (2002) (internal
citations omitted). Whether Mr. Jennings' attorneys actually discussed their knowledge
with him is unknown, but also of no consequence. Mr. Jennings is legally imputed with
the same information regardless. See Von Hake v. Thomas, cited above.
~

As noted above, Mr. Jennings is a manager of JENCO, a manager of JVC
Leasing, and was vice-president of Theta Investment in 2011. Under the same principalagency doctrine cited above, anything he knows or is imputed to know would also apply
to these companies. See Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-802(2)(a) (repealed 2013) ("each
manager is an agent of the company for the purpose of its business .... "); § 16-1 0a~

901 (5) ("Officer," "employee," "fiduciary," and "agent" include any person who ... is or
was serving at the corporation's request as a director, officer .... ").
lJj
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The Trial Court only made one conclusion regarding this imputed
knowledge through principal-agency relationship. In its Conclusions of Law, at
paragraph 34(i), the Trial Court noted: "If Mr. Jennings is deemed to know what Mr.
Blanchard knew, he would know that Mr. Blanchard contacted Mr. Tobler in March and

~

informed him (Mr. Tobler) that Mr. Hansen wanted to work directly with the Eskelsens
and that he (Mr. Blanchard) would not be preparing an escrow agreement." As discussed
Iii
below, this conclusion is based on inaccurate facts. It was Mr. Blanchard's May, not
March, communication that indicated there would be no escrow agreement. However,
the larger issue is that the Trial Court only found this one incident where Mr. Jennings
would have known what his attorneys knew, rather than imputing him with all the
knowledge his attorneys had gained about this case from the beginning of January 2011,
through March 2011.
By allow Mr. Jennings to essentially be shielded from what his attorneys
knew, the Trial Court created a loophole in the principal-agency imputed knowledge rule
of law. In other words, even though Mr. Jennings hired an attorney and that fact was
relayed to the opposing side, Mr. Jennings was free to act autonomously and it was the
opposing side's responsibility to ensure both Mr. Jennings and his attorneys received
information, despite the fact it would be unethical for another attorney to do so. See UT
R RPC Rule 4.2(a). In the present case, when the Eskelsens' attorney began
communicating with Mr. Blanchard, the Trial Court found the Eskelsens at fault for not
also communicating with Mr. Jennings directly. Thus, the Trial Court found Mr.
Jennings to be an innocent actor because he personally did not receive a direct response
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to his January 4, 2011, letter. This is contrary to the long-standing attorney-as-agent rule
of law.
As argued in the next section below, Mr. Jennings, and his companies, had
significant notice of the Eskelsens' claim through actual knowledge (by receiving a letter
directly), imputed knowledge (through his attorneys), constructive notice (through his
attorney and the UCC 1 filing), and inquiry notice (due to all these circumstances
combined). Thus, neither he nor his companies could have acted innocently when it
purchased the subject property.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THETA
INVESTMENT DID NOT HAVE NOTICE OF THE
ESKELSENS' SUPERIOR CLAIM

Theta Investment, the purchaser ofVC Holdings' interest in the subject
property, knew, or otherwise had notice the Hansens lacked authority to act on VC
Holdings' behalf. The December 27, 2010, letter sent to Mr. Jennings as manager of NC
Leasing gave actual notice of the Hansens' lack of authority. Since Mr. Jennings was
also vice-president of Theta Investment at that time, that company also had actual notice
and therefore its claim to the real property is defeated. See Grahn v. Gregory. 800 P .2d
320, 328 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) ("Actual or constructive notice defeats a subsequent
purchaser's interest. A subsequent purchaser must therefore, show that he had no actual
notice, i.e., no personal knowledge, of a prior conveyance or that the prior conveyance
did not impart constructive notice .... ").
The Trial Court determined that Mr. Jennings did initially receive notice,
but that notice was diminished for the following reasons: ( 1) The Eskelsens never
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responded to Mr. Jennings January 4, 2011, letter; (2) Mr. Jennings asked Mr. Hansen
about the Eskelsens' claims and relied on Mr. Hansen's representations; (3) Mr. Jennings
researched the Utah Department of Commerce's website which still listed Mr. Hansen as
manager of VC Holdings; (4) Mr. Jennings believed Mr. Hansen would pay his debts;
and (5) prior to the March 29, 2011, transfer Mr. Blanchard had told Mr. Tobler there
would be no escrow agreement. See Conclusions of Law paragraph 34
The basis for the Trial Court's conclusion is not in consensus with the facts
or the law. First, between January 7 and the date of the transfer, the Eskelsens' agent,
attorney Daniel J. Tobler, was in continual contact about these matters with one of Theta
Investment's agents, attorney E. Troy Blanchard of the law firm of Durham Jones &
Pinegar. Mr. Blanchard was in contact with his partner, Chris L. Engstrom, who was
working directly with Mr. Jennings and met on multiple occasions during this time period
and specifically discussed these matters. As argued above these attorneys were agents of
their respective client. See Von Hake v. Thomas, 858 P.2d 193, 194 n. 3 (Utah
Ct.App.1993 ).
Through his attorneys, Mr. Jennings had full knowledge of the loan
between the Eskelsens and the Hansens because Mr. Blanchard had actually drafted those
agreements. Further, Mr. Jennings knew the only reason the Eskelsens were not taking
further steps to exclude the Hansens after accepting their membership interest in VC
Holdings is because of a tentative agreement to allow the Hansens to broker a sale. He
knew the Eskelsens were waiting for a formal, written agreement to be drafted by his
attorney. He also knew that the Eskelsens were told by his attorney on March 22, 2011,
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that there was no rush because no distributions were coming out of the company any time
soon. He would have known this statement was made only one day before his other
attorney, Mr. Engstrom, ordered closing documents for a transaction to take place on
March 29, 2011, that would totally exclude the Eskelsens. While it is convenient for him
to say he knew nothing of the Eskelsens position on March 29, 2011, because he did not
personally receive a response to his January 4, 2011, letter; his agents had full knowledge
of the Eskelsens' position and he testified he discussed this with his attorneys on multiple
occasions.
Second, the information Mr. Jennings and Theta Investment's agents had
amounted to inquiry notice and he could not rely on Mr. Hansen for his inquiry. See
Universal C.I.T. Corp. v. Courtesy Motors, Inc., 333 P.2d 628, 629 (1959) ("Whatever is
notice enough to excite attention and put the party on his guard and call for inquiry is
notice of everything to which such inquiry might have led. When a person has sufficient
information to lead him to a fact, he shall be deemed conversant of it."); and O'Reilly v.
McLean, 37 P.2d 770, 775 (1934) ("Having sufficient information to put it upon inquiry,
it was intervener's duty to make such investigation and it is charged with the knowledge
which it would have thus obtained."); Pender v. Dowse, 265 P.2d 644, 649 (1954)
("Moreover, the inquiry must be made at a reliable source from which the true state of
facts will be naturally disclosed; it is not sufficient that the purchaser make an inquiry of
a person when he knows that it is to such person's interest to misrepresent or conceal the
existence of the outstanding interest, and that such person does deny its existence."); see
also Meyer v. Gen. Am. Corp., 569 P.2d 1094, 1097 (Utah 1977) ("It is notice, not
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knowledge, that the purchaser must have, and it need not be actual notice constructive
($)

notice is sufficient to defeat the purchaser's claim. Constructive notice can occur when
circumstances arise that should put a reasonable person on guard so as to require further
inquiry on his part.").
The fact Mr. Jennings received a letter directly informing him the Hansens'
authority in VC Holdings had been revoked was sufficient information to create a duty to
investigate the Eskelsens' claim further. Had he investigated further or possibly inquired
of his own attorneys he would have learned the Eskelsens' claim was legitimate. He also
may have learned his attorneys were in regular contact about these matters with the
Eskelsens' attorney if he did not already know this. Further, it was not adequate to
simply ask Mr. Hansen about the Eskelsens' claim given Mr. Hansen's incentive to lie so
that he could receive the sale proceeds. Accordingly, the information Mr. Jennings
would have learned with a proper investigation should be imputed to him and his
companies, including Theta Investment.
Third, relying on the Utah Department of Commerce's website alone is
inadequate inquiry for multiple reasons. One, it was Mr. Jennings' own attorney that
lulled the Eskelsens into not taking any further actions against the Hansens while they
waited for an escrow agreement; and two, Mr. Jennings himself had not update the
Department's website when he moved from vice-president to president of Theta
Investment for at least three to four years, indicating he should know it is not a reliable
source for definitive information.
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V&I

Finally, as argued above, the Trial Court confused the timing of Mr.
Jennings and the Eskelsens' attorneys' communication. It was Mr. Blanchard's May, not
March, communication that indicated there would be no escrow agreement. This was
well after the March 29, 2011, transaction. Thus, Mr. Jennings could not rely on his
attorney's communication in this instance as a reason he did not have notice of the
Eskelsens' claims.
Because Theta Investment, through its officer, had actual knowledge of the
Eskelsens' claim to VC Holdings and management of the same, had imputed knowledge
of the continual claim through its attorneys, had constructive notice of the Eskelsens'
claim through his attorneys and the UCC 1 Filing Statement, see Basin Loans, Inc. v.
Young. 764 P.2d 239,241 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (Because plaintiff perfected its lien,
defendant is deemed to have had constructive notice of it.), and had inquiry notice by
virtue of all these circumstances described above; Theta Investment knew or otherwise
had notice that the Hansens lacked authority to transact business on behalf of VC
Holdings on March 29, 2011, to include transferring its interest in the real property.
Therefore, the March 29, 2011, transaction must be unwound because Theta Investment
was not an innocent party and the Hansens could not bind VC Holdings. The Hansens'
lack of authority is more specifically argued in the next section below.

III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE
HANSENS HAD AUTHORITY TO ACT FOR VC HOLDINGS
ON MARCH 29, 2011

As they became the sole members of VC Holdings, the Eskelsens also
removed the Hansens as managers and placed themselves in that position. From that
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point fmward the Hansens were no longer managers ofVC Holdings and could not act on
behalf of the company. Utah Code Ann.§ 48-2c-802(2)(c) (repealed 2013) states:
[A]n act of a manager, including the signing of a document in the
company name, for apparently carrying on in the ordinary course of the
company business, or business of the kind carried on by the company,
binds the company unless the manager had no authority to act for the
company in the particular matter and the lack of authority was expressly
described in the articles of organization or the person with whom the
manager was dealing knew or otherwise had notice that the manager
lacked authority.

(emphasis added). The Trial Court also cited this section in its Conclusions of Law, at
paragraph 37; as one basis for its determination that Mr. Hansen had authority; however,
the Trial Court only focused on the "'lack of authority was expressly described in the
articles of organization" provision and not the "or the person with whom the manager
was dealing knew or otherwise had notice that the manager lacked authority" provision.
As argued above, Theta Investment knew Mr. Hansen did not have authority.
The Trial Court, at Conclusions of Law paragraph 39, also quoted the
Operating Agreement of VC Holdings, LLC, as the other basis for Mr. Hansen's
authority:
5.4 Required Member Approval. Notwithstanding any other provision of
this Agreement, without the approval of Members whose aggregate
Membership interest in at least 51 percent, the Managers may take no
action with respect to: the sale, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge or other
disposition of all or substantially all of the Company's assets' ....
The Trial Court correctly found that the Eskelsens had foreclosed on the Hansens'
membership interests in VC Holdings, see Conclusions of Law at paragraph 13, and
therefore the Hansens could not sale VC Holdings property without the Eskelsens'
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approval; however, the Trial Court also found that Mr. Jennings had no knowledge of this
fact. However, as argued above, Mr. Jennings had significant and continual notice of the
Eskelsens' claim. This must amount to knowledge that the Hansens lacked authority, or
at least that their authority was in serious question and they should not be dealt with at
the exclusion of the Eskelsens. Especially since Mr. Jennings knew the Hansens'
financial difficulties.
Further, from the time the Eskelsens became managers of VC Holdings,
they did not grant authority to the Hansens to act on VC Holdings' behalf, nor did they
say or do anything to create the appearance of authority. See Franklin Credit Mgmt.
Corp. v. Hanney. 262 P.3d 406,414 {UT App 2011) (Apparent authority is appropriately
found where 'the acts or conduct of the principal ... creates an appearance which causes
a third party ... to reasonably believe that a second party ... has authority to act on the
principal's behalf.' Thus, 'an analysis of apparent authority focuses on the acts of the
v,

principal from a third party's perspective.').
Accordingly, the Hansens' actions on March 29, 2011, exchanging VC
Holdings' interest in JVC Leasing for an interest in the real property and then transferring
that real property interest to Theta Investment, was done without authority both because
the Hansens were no longer managers of VC Holdings and because they did not have the

VP

Eskelsens' approval. Further, the Eskelsens did not know the Hansens had acted on VC
Holdings' behalf until several months later, and therefore cannot be said to have ratified
the Hansens' actions. See Ercanbrack v. Crandall-Walker Motor Co., 550 P.2d 723, 725
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(Utah 1976) (Ratification of an act about which the principal knows nothing is inherently
impossible.).
For these reasons, the Hansens lacked authority and Mr. Jennings knew, or
otherwise had notice of this fact, but seemingly chose to ignore this information for his
own purposes. Accordingly, the Hansens' actions should be unwound placing the real
property and membership interests in their pre-March 29, 2011, positions.

IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THE
HANSENS DID NOT COMMIT A FRAUDULENT
TRANSFER

Although the Hansens lacked authority to act on behalf of VC Holdings as
described above, even if they did have some form of authority, the transfer of VC
Holdings' property interest is voidable as a fraudulent transfer under the Utah Fraudulent
Transfer Act. Further, Theta Investment is not protected as a bona fide purchaser for
value for the same notice reasons argued above and the fact it did not prove all the other
elements of a bona fide purchaser for value.
The purpose of the Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act is to allow a creditor the
opportunity to invalidate a transfer of assets made by a debtor if the transfer has the effect
of placing the assets out of the reach of creditors. See Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d
1244, 1260 (Utah 1987) (the Act "should be construed with liberality so as to reach all
artifices and evasions designed to rob the Act of its full force and effect in preventing
debtors from paying the just claims of their creditors."); Nat'l Loan Investors, L.P. v.
Givens, 952 P.2d 1067, 1069 (Utah 1998) ("The Utah Act is a codification of the
common law that provided a remedy against debtors who sought to conceal their assets
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from creditors. "The law has long held that transfers of property designed to place a
debtor's assets beyond the reach of the debtor's creditors are void as to the creditors."
Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244, 1260 (Utah 1987) (citing early common law cases).
Because the Fraudulent Transfer Act is remedial in nature, it should be liberally
construed. Id. at 1260.").
Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-5(1 )(a) states, in relevant part: "A transfer made ..
. by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the creditor's claim arose before or
after the transfer was made ... , if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation:
(a) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor ....
The Utah Court of Appeals has determined a creditor who claims a debtor
transferred property with actual intent to defraud under§ 25-6-5(l)(a) must establish that
~

claim by clear and convincing evidence, see Territorial Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Baird, 781
P.2d 452, 462 (Utah Ct.App.1989), and notes:
Nevertheless, "[ f]raudulent intent is ordinarily considered a question of
fact, and 'may be inferred from the presence of certain indicia of fraud or
"badges of fraud.""' Id. at 462 (quoting Dahnken, Inc. v. Wilmarth, 726
P.2d 420,423 (Utah 1986)) (other citations and footnotes omitted). Utah's
statute codifies those factors historically considered by the common law as
indicia or badges of fraud.
Bradford v. Bradford, 993 P.2d 887, 891-92 (UT App. 1999). Because the "badges of
fraud" are present in this case, as detailed below, the Hansens had fraudulent intent in
their dealings with Theta Investment on March 29, 2011.
Under the definitions in § 25-6-2, applicable to the Fraudulent Transfer
Act, the Hansens were clearly a "debtor," the Eskelsens were a "creditor" with a "claim,"
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~

the transaction facilitated by the Hansens and Mr. Jennings on March 29, 2011, was a
"transfer;" which is defined, in part: "as every mode ... of disposing of or parting with
an asset or an interest in an asset . . . . § 25-6-2( 12), and "asset" is defined as "property
of the debtor .... " § 25-6-2(2). This last definition is the only deviation from a clear

~

application of the Act in this case. The question is, was VC Holdings' 38.1 % interest in

NC Leasing, which the Hansens exchanged for the 38.1 % interest in the real property
~

before selling the property to Theta Investment, an "asset" of the Hansens. This is also
the basis for the Trial Court's determination that relief cannot be granted under the Act:
"Even if the Hansens and VC Holdings interests can somehow be melded together so as
to become a "Debtor" .... " See Conclusion of Law at paragraph 8. In other words, the
Trial Court did not interpret the Act to allow relief in this case.
Technically, the asset the Hansens directly owned was their membership
interests in VC Holdings, and VC Holdings actually owned the interest in NC Leasing
which in turn owned the real property. Despite this, the Hansens' actions should be

4w

considered a fraudulent transfer under the Act because the transfer in which they
participated effectively gutted the value from their asset. In other words, their actions
~

made the member interests in VC Holdings worthless, the same result as if they had
actually transferred their membership interests away. Given the Fraudulent Transfer
Act's remedial purpose and Higher Courts' directive to liberally construe its provisions to
ensure a debtor cannot rob a creditor, the Hansens' act of gutting or otherwise disposing
of the only valuable asset VC Holdings owned should be considered the equivalent of the
Hansens directly transferring away their interests in VC Holdings. It has the same effect
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of placing the property, or value thereof, out of the reach of the Eskelsens. If the Act's
~

definitions are interpreted this broadly, the remainder of the Act clearly applies in this
case.
VJP

Regarding "actual intent" to hinder, delay, or defraud, Utah Code Ann. §
25-6-5(2) states:

~

~

To determine "actual intent" under Subsection ( 1)(a), consideration may be
given, among other factors, to whether:
(a) the transfer or obligation was to an insider;
(b) the debtor retained possession or control of the property
transferred after the transfer;
(c) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed;
(d) before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the
debtor had been sued or threatened with suit;
(e) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets;
(f) the debtor absconded;
(g) the debtor removed or concealed assets;
(h) the value of the consideration received by the debtor was
reasonably equivalent to the value of the asset transferred or the
amount of the obligation incurred;
(i) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the
transfer was made or the obligation was incurred;
(j) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial
debt was incurred; and
(k) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a
lienor who transferred the assets to an insider of the debtor.

\ii)

§ 25-6-5(2) (emphasis added).
Most of the factors above evidence the Hansens' actual intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud the Eskelsens. The transfer at issue was to an "insider." Section 25-62(7)( e) defines an "insider" as: ''an affiliate, or an insider of an affiliate as if the affiliate
were the debtor .... " "Affiliate," under subsection (l)(d) is defined as: ''a person who .
. . controls substantially all of the debtor's assets." In this case, Mr. Jennings was the
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manager of NC Leasing, which controlled VC Holdings' only asset (the real property
interest at issue in this case) which was the Hansens' largest asset. Theta Investment, the
purchaser of the property interest, was an "insider" to Mr. Jennings because he was the
vice-president at that time (see subsection (7)(a)(iv)).

Therefore, the property was

transferred to an "insider" of an "affiliate," which by definition was an "insider" to the
Hansens.
Other factors evidencing actual intent include the fact the transfer was
concealed from the Eskelsens as Mr. Blanchard's communication with Mr. Tobler lead
the Eskelsens to believe no transaction was impending. Further, the Hansens had been
threatened with legal action in approximately September of 2010 when Mr. Tobler had
spoken to him about his debt to the Eskelsens. The property interest at issue was VC
Holdings' only asset, which was the Hansens' most valuable asset.

The Hansens

absconded after the transfer by moving from the southern Utah area without notice. The
Hansens essentially hide the proceeds of the sale in a separate business account and then
used them for personal debts and expenses. Finally, the Hansens were insolvent before
the transfer.
As additional evidence that Mr. Hansen committed a fraudulent transfer
with "actual intent" to hinder, delay, or defraud the Eskelsens is his own admission that
he did something he thought was wrong. Although Mr. Hansen testified he relied on Mr.
Jennings for advice on these matters, he still knew what he was doing was wrong. In its
simplest terms, the Hansens committed fraud by making an asset that was securing a loan
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worthless by selling the only valuable part of the asset and then absconding with all the
proceeds for personal use.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING
THE ESKELSENS HAD THE BURDEN OF PROVING
THETA INVESTMENT'S AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF
BONA FIDE PURCHASER FOR VALUE

In its Answer to Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Theta Investment raised
~

the bona fide purchaser for value defense as its Sixteenth Affirmative Defense [R. 120].
Accordingly, Theta Investment had the burden of proving each element of the defense in
order to retain ownership of the interest in the subject property as an innocent purchaser.
See Seale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361, 1363 (Utah 1996) ("As with any affirmative
defense, defendants have the burden of proving every element ....").
To be protected as a bona fide purchaser for value, Theta Investment must
show that it paid valuable consideration and did so in good faith without notice. See
Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188, 1197 (Utah 1993) (A bona fide purchaser is one who
pays valuable consideration for a conveyance, acts in good faith, and takes without notice
of an adverse claim or others' outstanding rights to the seller's title); see also Utah Code
Ann. § ?0A-8-303 (defining "protected purchaser" (previously "bona fide purchaser") as
one "who: gives value; does not have notice of an adverse claim to the security; and
obtains control of the security .... ").
Further, the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, of which Utah's Act is
based, at section 8, comment 1, states, in relevant part: "The person who invokes this
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defense carries the burden of establishing good faith and the reasonable equivalence of
the consideration exchanged."
Also regarding the defense of bona fide purchaser under the Fraudulent
Transfer Act, Utah Code Ann. § 25-6-9(1) states: "A transfer or obligation is not voidable
under Subsection 25-6-5(1 )(a) against a person who took in good faith and for a
reasonably equivalent value or against any subsequent transferee or obligee."
Good faith, or a lack thereof, hinges on the same notice principles argued
above. See S.E.C. v. Madison Real Estate Grp., LLC, 647 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1280 (D.
Utah 2009) ("Good faith embodies the concept that one is free "from knowledge of
circumstances which ought to put the holder on inquiry."); In re Tri-Valley Distrib., Inc.,
452 B.R. 837, 852 (Bankr. D. Utah 2011) (Good faith is "measured objectively and that
'if the circumstances would place a reasonable person on inquiry of a debtor's fraudulent
purpose, and a diligent inquiry would have discovered the fraudulent purpose, then the
transfer is fraudulent."').
The Trial Court determined the Eskelsens could not receive relief, in part,
because they did not prove Theta Investment did not pay "reasonably equivalent value."
See Conclusion of Law at paragraph 8 and 10. However, as the case law and statutes
cited above show, it was not the Eskelsens burden to prove Theta Investment's defense.
Theta Investment did not act in good faith as it had notice of the Eskelsen' s
adverse claim. The fact that Mr. Jennings brokered the deal with the Hansens, had his
attorney/agent request and/or prepare the closing documents, dictated who and how the
transaction would occur, and did not give any notice to the Eskelsens, all while having
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full know ledge of the Eskelsens' claim precludes Theta Investment from being a bona
fide purchaser because it could not have acted in good faith.
Additionally, Theta Investment did not prove at trial that it had paid
valuable consideration. Both Mr. Hansen and Mr. Jennings testified they did not have the
property interest appraised, but relied on an accountant to give a general range of possible
values. However, in the end Mr. Jennings testified he simply offered what Theta
Investment had on hand, approximately $240,000.00, and Mr. Hansen testified he lacked
the bargaining power to negotiate otherwise, but did not believe this was fair market
value. Mr. Hansen testified there was another interested third-party that had recently
offered $350,000.00 for the same interest. Mr. Jennings testified he also spoke with this
person.
Although Theta Investment paid value for the property interest, the
evidence presented suggests it was not reasonably equivalent to the property interest's
actual value. A useful definition of fair market value comes from Utah's Property Tax
Act: "'Fair market value' means the amount at which property would change hands
between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy
or sell and both having reasonable know ledge of the relevant facts." Utah Code Ann. §
59-2-102(12).
The Trial Court erred in its Conclusions of Law, at paragraph I 0, by
concluding the Eskelsens failed to establish fair market value, and therefore their cause of
action failed. However, bona fide purchaser for value is Theta Investment's defense.
Once a transfer without authority or a fraudulent transfer is established, the purchaser
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may try to retain the asset by proving its innocence. In this case Theta Investment did not
prove its innocence, either by showing it acted in good faith or by showing it paid fair
market value. Accordingly, the March, 29, 2011, transfer should be voided.
VI.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING IN PART THE
ESKELSENS' MOTION TO AMEND ITS FINDINGS

The present case presents a relatively confusing set of circumstances. With
multiple actors, entities, communications, and transfers taking place over a relatively
short period of time it is understandably a difficult situation to unfold. In addition to the
errors argued above, the Trial Court made a few incorrect Findings of Fact that the
Eskelsens moved to correct under Rule 52(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
These incorrect findings potentially had a significant impact on the Court's conclusions.
Specifically:
Paragraph 31 of the Findings of Fact presently states: "Mr. Tobler never
gave Mr. Blanchard the Foreclosure Letter or the signed Agreements." It should be
found that although Mr. Tobler did not give Mr. Blanchard signed agreements between
the Hansens and the Eskelsens, Mr. Blanchard actually drafted those exact agreements
and remembered that fact at the time he was discussing these matters with Mr. Tobler.
[R. 1096, Trial Tr. vol. I, 195 :4-17; 198:4-9; 214:25 - 215: 11, Mar. 30, 2015]. Thus it is
really of no significance that Mr. Tobler did not provide him with signed agreements
because he already knew exactly what was in them.
Further regarding Paragraph 31, Mr. Blanchard testified he did not
remember receiving a copy of the letters sent by Mr. Tobler to the Hansens or Mr.
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Jennings, but believes he saw them at some point and knew of their content, but does not
~

remember the source. [R. 1096, Trial Tr. vol. 1, 181 :4-20, Mar. 30, 2015]. Both these
changes to Paragraph 31 are significant because it further shows what knowledge Mr.
Jennings had, or should have had, prior to the March 29, 2011, transaction.
Paragraph 32 of the Findings of Fact presently states: "Mr. Tobler never
discussed Gilbert Jennings' request for documents with Mr. Blanchard." However, Mr.
Blanchard's testimony was that he did not remember it being discussed, not that it was
never discussed. [R. 1096, Trial Tr. vol. 1, 211 :2-8, Mar. 30, 2015]. Further, as noted
just above, Mr. Blanchard testified he saw the letters Mr. Jennings and the Hansens
received and he actually drafted the agreements between the Eskelsens and the Hansens.
Thus, Mr. Blanchard already had all the documentation Mr. Jennings had requested.
Paragraph 45 of the Findings of Fact presently states: "Approximately one
month later on March 22, 2011, Mr. Blanchard informed Mr. Tobler that Hansen wanted
to work directly with the Eskelsens and that he (Mr. Blanchard) would not be preparing
an agreement. (See Ex. 8 & 9)." However, this finding is not accurate. In the
communication that occurred on March 22, 2011, between Mr. Tobler and Mr.
Blanchard, Mr. Blanchard states that he had spoken with Mr. Hansen that day, and that
Mr. Hansen was working on a payment for the Eskelsens. See Ex. 8. Because of this,
Mr. Blanchard had not prepared the escrow agreement. Id. Mr. Tobler responded by
email: "Depending on how large this payment is, I think [the Eskelsens] would still like
to have [an escrow agreement] in place." Id. To this, Mr. Blanchard responded by email:
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"If [Mr. Hansen] can't get this all worked out by next week, then I agree I should just
prepare the escrow documents." Id.
It was not until May 4, 2011, that Mr. Tobler and Mr. Blanchard had a

conversation wherein Mr. Blanchard informed Mr. Tobler that he would not be working
with Mr. Hansen any longer and would not be preparing an escrow agreement. [R. 1096,
Trial Tr. vol. 1, 35: 11 - 36:7, Mar. 30, 2015]. The timing of these communications is
paramount. On March 22, 2011, just seven days before the March 29, 2011, transaction,
Mr. Blanchard stated that if things could not be worked out, then he should prepare the
escrow documents. Whether intentional or not, this lulled the Eskelsens into continuing
to wait for a mutually beneficial outcome involving all parties, supposedly being
brokered by Mr. Jennings' attorneys. The Eskelsens had no knowledge of a plan to cut
them completely out of the picture so the Hansens could get quick money, and the
Jennings could get cheap property.
Because these findings have significant impact on the conclusions reached
by the Trial Court, they should be amended.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the transfers that occurred between NC Leasing,
VC Holdings, and Theta Investment on March 29, 2011, should be declared void and
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-1301 et. seq., title to the 31.8% property interest at
issue in this case should be restored to NC Leasing and the interest therein should be
restored to VC Holdings as though the transactions never occurred. The laws of agency,
authority, and notice properly applied to the facts of this case clearly show that the
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~

Hansens did not have authority to transact business for VC Holdings, and Mr. Jennings
had notice (actual, constructive, imputed, and inquiry) that would preclude him and his
companies from being bona fide purchasers for value.
Further, because the transaction on March 29, 2011, between the present
parties should be voided, any profits, distributions, or other benefits Theta Investment has
received by virtue of holding the 31.8% property interest at issue in this case should be
disgorged and paid to or credited to VC Holdings.
Submitted this -2iday of February, 2017
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WASHINGTON COUNTY
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT By _ _ _ _ __

IN AND FOR WASIDNGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CHAD ESKELSEN and
LORNA ESKELSEN
Plaintiffs,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

VAUGHN L. HANSEN; CAROLYN S.
HANSEN; VC HOLDINGS, LLC; THETA
INVESTMENT COMPANY

Trial Dates: March 30 & 31
(Bench Trial)

THETA INVESTMENT COMPANY,
Counter and Cross Claimant,
Case No. 120500400

V.

CHAD ESKELSEN and

LORNA ESKELSEN

Judge Jeffrey C. Wilcox

Counterclaim Defendants,
VC HOLDINGS, LLC and VAUGHN
HANSEN
Cross-claim Defendants

This case came before the Court for a two day bench trial on March 30 and 31, 2015. At
the end of trial the Court took the matter under advisement and requested that the parties provide
proposed fmdings of fact and conetusions of law and proposed judgments for the Courts further
consideration. Having reviewed the pleadings, trial notes, the proposed findings/conclusions
I
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and judgments, and for the reasons set forth below the Court hereby rules against the Plaintiff's
~

and in favor of Defendant Theta Investment Company.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On or about July 31, 2000, Gilbert M. Jennings (hereinafter "Mr. Jennings") formed

JENCO, LC (hereinafter "JENCO"), and was manager of the same. (See Ex. 22).
2. On or about January 6, 2005, Vaughn and Carolyn Hansen (hereinafter "the Hansens")
formed a company called VC Holdings, LLC (hereinafter "VC Holdings") and filed Articles of
Organization with the Utah Department of Commerce. (See Ex. 26). In June of 2007, the
Hansens both became managers of VC Holdings. (See Ex. 52).
3. On June 28, 2007, the Hansens, as sole members ofVC Holdings, LLC, executed an
Amendment to the VC Holdings LLC Operating Agreement indicating that the Company was
managed by its managers, including Carolyn S. Hansen and Vaughn Hansen. (See Ex. 52).
4. On November 17, 2007, VC Holdings updated its official records with the State of

Utah Department of Commerce to indicate Vaughn Hansen was the Manager ofVC Holdings.
(See Ex. 38).

5. At some point the Hansens agreed to allow Vaughn Hansen to execute documents on
behalf of VC Holdings as manager without another manager's signature. (See Tr. vol. II, 74:9-13
(Hansen)).
6. Mr. Hansen and Mr. Jennings have known each other for over 30 years, first meeting
when Mr. Hansen was only 12 years old, and have had ongoing business with each other for
many of those years. (Tr. Vol. I, 66:19-67:14 (Hansen)) Mr. Hansen also testified that he relied
on Mr. Jennings for financial and legal advice. (See Id. at 19: 15).
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7. In 2007, the Hansens and Mr. Jennings agreed to have their companies, VC Holdings
and JENCO, purchase real property in the Fort Pierce Industrial Park, St. George, Utah.8. The
property, described as: "Proposed Lot 158 Fort Pierce Industrial Park" was purchased in part by
each company on August 15, 2007. (See Ex. 14).
8. On March 24, 2008, VC Holdings and JENCO formed JVC Leasing, LC (hereinafter
"JVC Leasing"). Mr. Jennings was made manager. (Jg.).
9. On June 9, 2008, VC Holdings and JENCO together transferred 100% of the Property
to JVC Leasing, LC. (See Ex. 15).
l.fp

10. In return JENCO received a 68.2% interest in NC Leasing, and VC Holdings
received a 31.8% interest in JVC Leasing. (See Ex. 25 p. 24).
11. On May 12, 2009, Chad and Loma Eskelsen (hereinafter "the Eskelsens") loaned the
Hansens $120,000.00, and the Hansens signed a Promissory Note regarding the same. (See Ex.
1).

12. As security for the loan, the Hansens executed a Limited Liability Company
Membership Interest Pledge Agreement pledging 100% of the totaled issued and outstanding
membership interests in VC Holdings to the Eskelsens. (See Ex. 2).
~

13. VC Holdings was not a party to the Promissory Note. (See Ex. 1).
14. In the summer of 2010, the Eskelsens hired an attorney, Daniel J. Tobler, to pursue
~

the Hansens for failing to repay the loan. (See Tr. Vol. I, 9:19-10: 14 (Tobler))
15. Mr. Tobler contacted Mr. Hansen and discussed the Hansens default. (Id. at 10: 1523). They discussed the Hansens executing a confession ofjudgment in lieu of a lawsuit. Mr.
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Hansen agreed to the confession, but never followed through. (Id. at 10: 24-11 :10). Neither the
Eskelsens nor Mr. Tobler was able to contact the Hansens after these initial discussions. ( Id.).
16. On October 28, 2010, the Eskelsens filed a UCC 1 Acknowledgment of Filing
Statement with the Utah Department of Commerce showing them as secured parties to 100% of
the membership interest in VC Holdings. (See Ex. 35).
17. On December 30, 2010, Mr. Tobler sent a letter dated December 27, 2010 to Vaughn
and Carolyn Hansen (the "Foreclosure Letter"). (See Ex. 17; see also Tr. vol. I, 16:1-8
(Tobler)).
18. The Foreclosure Letter stated that the Eskelsens were accepting the Hansens total
issued and outstanding membership interests in VC Holdings in full satisfaction of the Hansens
obligation to the Eskelsens. (Id).
19. The Foreclosure Letter also stated that, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated§ 48-2-c804(6)(c) and paragraph 5.l0(c) of the Operating Agreement ofVC Holdings, the Eskelsens were
removing the Hansens as managers ofVC Holdings. (Id).
20. The Foreclosure Letter also stated that the Hansens had 20 days after the letter was
sent to object to the Eskelsens "proposal." (Id).
21. Although the Foreclosure Letter was sent via certified mail, no one signed indicating
receipt of the Foreclosure letter. (See Tr. vol. I, 18:4-25 (Court), 45:16-24 (Tobler)).
22. Mr. Hansen testified that he did not see the Foreclosure Letter until long after the sale
of the Property occurred. (See Tr. vol. I, 88: 17-24, 93:5-9, 120:7-21 (Hansen)).
23. On December 30, 2010, the Es~elsens attorney, Dan Tobler, sent a different letter to
NC Leasing and Gilbert Jennings. (See Ex. 18).
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24. Tobler's letter to NC Leasing stated that the "Eskelsens have elected to be admitted
as members of VC Holdings, and are now managers of the same. Thus all notices from NC
Leasing, LC, and payments or distributions for VC Holdings, LLC' s 31. 8% interest in NC
Leasing, LC, shall be paid to the Eskelsens at the address listed below." (Id).
25. Tobler's letter to NC Leasing did not include a copy of the Foreclosure Letter or the
loan documents between the Eskelsens and Hansens. (See Tr. vol. I, 48: 1-7 (Tobler)).
~

26. Tobler's letter to NC Leasing did not reference the 20-day objection period, nor did
it state that Vaughn Hansen would be removed as manager ofVC Holdings. (See Ex. 18).
27. At the time Mr. Tobler sent the December 30, 2010 letter to NC Leasing, Gilbert
Jennings knew nothing about the Eskelsens or their dealings with the Hansens. (See Tr. vol. I,
232: 6-10 (Jennings)).
28. On January 7, 2011, Mr. Tobler received a phone call from attorney E. Troy
Blanchard of the law firm Durham Jones & Pinegar. (See Tr. Vol. I, 21:18-23; see also Ex 6).

Mr. Blanchard stated he was calling as a favor to the Hansens, but that his firm officially
represented Mr. Jennings. (Id.). Mr. Blanchard stated he did not believe the Eskelsens had
properly foreclosed the membership interest in VC Holdings (Id).; however, rather than dispute
~

this issue, he suggested a potential compromise to allow Mr. Hansen to broker a sale of the
subject property to Mr. Jennings (through one of his entities), place the proceeds in escrow, and
then the Hansens and Eskelsens could determine how the proceeds should be distributed. Mr.
Tobler agreed to consult with the Eskelsens and then contact Mr. Blanchard with an answer. (Id.
at 28:4-9).
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29. Blanchard and Tobler began these discussions less than 20 days after Tobler sent the
~

Foreclosure Letter to the Hansens and before Tobler received the request for documents from
Gilbert Jennings. (See Ex. 17, see also Tr. vol. I, 51: 1-22, 21 :18-23, 22:15-17 {Tobler)).
30. On January 11, 2011, Mr. Tobler received a letter from Mr. Jennings, dated January
4, 2011, on behalf of NC Leasing in response to his letter dated December 27, 2011. (See Ex.
20; Tr. Vol.I, 21 :24-22:4 (Tobler)). In that letter, Mr. Jennings requested "documentary proof
of the transition of ownership" of VC Holdings. (See Ex. 20). Mr. Jennings also informed Mr.
Tobler that VC Holdings was "indebted to the Company in the amount of $54,270.50," and
suggested that the Eskelsens "contact me and work out a repayment plan. (Id.).
31. Mr.Tobler never gave Mr. Blanchard the Foreclosure Letter or the signed agreements.

(See Tr. vol. I, 211: 12-17 (Blanchard), 46:7-13, 50:4-11 (Tobler)).
32. Mr. Tobler never discussed Gilbert Jennings' request for documents with Mr.
Blanchard. (See Tr. vol. I, 211 :9-11 (Blanchard)).
33. Mr. Tobler never provided documents to Mr. Blanchard in response to Gilbert
Jennings request. (See Tr. vol. I, 211: 12-17 (Blanchard), 50:4-11 (Tobler)).
34. Mr. Tobler testified after his phone call with Mr. Blanchard he believed he had made
official contact with both Mr. Jennings' law firm and unofficially with the Hansens' attorney,
{See Tr. Vol. I, 21:24-22:4 (Tobler)), and that it would not be ethical for him to contact either
Hansen or Jennings directly. (Id. at 27: 5-11 ).
35. Mr. Jennings testified that he worked mostly with attorney Chris L. Engstrom also of
Durham Jones & Pinegar, and that Mr. Blanchard worked with him directly on at least two other
projects. Id. at 226: 17-12: 227: 7-lS(Jennings)).

Mr. Blanchard also testified he had worked
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~

directly with Mr. Jennings in about early 2011. (Id. at 208: 20-209:8). Mr. Blanchard further
testified that he and Mr. Engstrom were both shareholders at Durham Jones & Pinegar. (Id. at
208: 20-209:8).
36. Mr. Tobler never responded to Mr. Jennings' request for documents. (See Tr. vol. I,
50:1-11 (Tobler); Tr. vol. II, 38:14-24 (Jennings)).

37. After Mr. Jennings received Mr. Tobler's letter, Jennings specifically asked Mr.
Hansen about the Eskelsens' claims. Mr. Jennings testified that Mr. Hansen told him that he
(Hansen) was still the owner of VC Holdings. (See Tr. vol. I, 238:23 - 239:6 (Jennings)).
38. The Court believes that Mr. Hansen would make that statement to Mr. Jennings

VP

because, as set forth below, he was desperate for money and had access to money ifhe was the
controlling manager ofVC Holdings, and could sell VC Holdings interest in JVC Leasing.
39. After Mr. Jennings received Mr. Tobler's letter, Jennings searched the State of
Utah's Department of Commerce records (i.e. its website)and found that Mr. Hansen was still
listed as Manager of VC Holdings. (See Tr. vol. I, 239:2-5 (Jennings)).

40. The purpose of the discussion between Blanchard and Tobler was to potentially
arrange an escrow agreement to place any funds or distributions from NC Leasing in escrow for
the purpose of paying Hansens' debt to the Eskelsens'. (See Tr. vol. I, 182: 10-15 (Blanchard)).

41. On January 19, 2011, Mr. Tobler contacted Mr. Blanchard to inform him that the
Eskelsens would agree to the proposed escrow agreement. (Id. at 31: 7-14).

Mr. Tobler

understood that all sides, the Eskelsens, the Hansens, and Mr. Jennings, would agree to and sign
the agreement. fld.) Mr. Blanchard also testified this was his understanding. (See Id. At 194:21195:3 (Blanchard)).
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42. On February 22, 2011, Mr. Blanchard sent an email to Mr. Tobler stating: "I
apologize for the delay in getting back to you. It is not Vaughn's fault, but mine as I have not
gotten to the Escrow Agreement yet. I will put together a draft this week and get it to you. I will
also contact the Jennings to confirm they will agree to the escrow of funds to the extent of any
distribution pursuant to the escrow agreement." (See Ex. 7). Mr. Blanchard testified that when
he wrote that he would "contact the Jennings" he meant he would talk to Mr. Engstrom. (See Tr.
Vol. I, 200: 111-l 7(Blanchard)).
43. Mr. Blanchard also testified that he told Mr. Tobler that he would either consult with

Mr. Jennings or Mr. Engstrom about the escrow agreement to ensure it was acceptable to the
Jennings. (Id. at 189: 7-13).
44. Mr. Blanchard testified that he had a conversation with Mr. Engstrom about the
escrow agreement and the Jennings would not have a problem with it. (Id. at 189: 7-13). Mr.
Blanchard also testified that he informed Mr. Tobler that the Hansens and Mr. Jennings were on
board with an agreement. (Id. at 193: 15-22).
45. Approximately one month later on March 22, 2011, Mr. Blanchard informed Mr.
Tobler that Hansen wanted to work directly with the Eskelsens and that he (Mr. Blanchard)
would not be preparing an agreement. (See Ex. 8 & 9).
46. Mr Blanchard further informed Mr. Tobler that he (Mr. Tobler) should contact
Blanchard if the Eskelsens did not hear from Hansen in the next day or so. (See Tr. vol. I, 55:3-6
(Tobler); 212: 13-20 (Blanchard)).
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47. Mr. Blanchard also infonned Mr. Tobler that "[n]o distributions are being paid out
~

of the LLC, and haven't been for a long time, and it's unlikely distribution will be made for the
foreseeable future." (See Ex. 8).
48. Mr. Blanchard testified that when he sent these emails on March 22, 2011, he did not
know there was any plan between the Hansens and Mr. Jennings to sell the property interest at
issue in this case. See March 30, 2015, (1501) Audio at 36:15.

Mr. Tobler also testified that he did not understand these emails to mean the property might be
sold. (See Tr. Vol. I, 202:23-203:S(Blanchard)).
49. Because of financial difficulties the Hansen had been trying to sell their interest in
the Property during 2010. (See Tr. vol. I, 98:8-13 (Hansen), Tr. vol. II, 33:1-5 (Jennings)).
50. Mr. Hansen testified that he received an offer on the property sometime in the
summer or fall of 2010, but the offer never materialized. (See Tr. vol. II, 33:6-21 (Jennings)).
51. In a further attempt to alleviate their financial difficulties, Mr. Hansen asked, on
behalf ofVC Holdings, to receive distributions from NC Leasing, but Mr. Jennings as the
majority owner (through Theta) of NC Leasing overruled his request and elected instead to build
a reserve fund. (See Tr. Vil. I, 111: 10-16(Hansen)).
52. Hansen also approached Mr. Jennings and offered to sell VC Holdings interest NC
Leasing to Mr. Jennings or one of his entities. (See Tr. vol. II, I 0:21-24 (Jennings), Tr. vol. I,
100:21-23 (Hansen)).
53. Because of the state of the economy in St. George at that time, Mr. Jennings was not
very interested in Mr. Hansen's proposal. But in an attempt to help the Hansens, Mr. Jennings
decided to consider the Hansens' offer. (See Tr. vol. II, 47:10-12).
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54. Between January and March of 2011, Mr. Jennings testified he had multiple meetings
with Mr. Engstrom and the Eskelsens were discussed in those meetings. (See Tr. Vol. I, 237:1024: Vol. II, 18:23-19:10 (Jennings)).
55. Although Mr. Jennings testified he did not send a second letter or attempted to
contact the Eskelsens or call Mr. Tobler directly, (See Tr. Vol. II, 8:2-228 (Jennings)), he also
testified he had "exhausted everything I knew what do to do" to discover if the Eskelsens had a
valid claim. (See Tr. Vol. I, 241: 7-8 (Jennings)).
56. Ultimately, some three months after Mr. Jennings received Mr. Tobler's letter
regarding the Eskelsens' claims and having heard nothing more about them, Mr. Jennings and
the Hansens agreed to the sale and purchase and ofVC Holdings ownership interest in NC
Leasing, by Theta for a sales price of$236,337.00. The sale was accomplished by a somewhat
complicated process involving a 1031 property exchange.

57. Prior to the sale, Mr. Hansen testified he asked Mr. Jennings specifically if he had
authority to conduct business on behalf ofVC Holdings. (See Tr. Vol. I, 104:8-10; 135:22136:S(Hansen)). He stated Mr. Jennings told him the Eskelsens' claim was not valid. (Id. at
105: 5-10). Mr. Hansen stated he would not have participated in the transaction if Mr. Jennings
had told him it was not legal. (Id. at 105: 11-15).

58. Conversely, Mr. Jennings testified it was Mr. Hansen who told him the Eskelsens did
not have a valid claim, (Id. at 249: 4-7(Jennings)) and that he and Mr. Hansen had several
0.9

conversations about the Eskelsens between January and March 2011. (See Tr. Vol. II, 7: 311 (Jennings)).
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59. Both Plaintiff and the Jennings Defendants subpoenaed Vaughan Hansen for the trial.
~

He testified at length for and against each side. After witnessing his demeanor on the witness
stand and hearing his testimony this Court finds much of his testimony to be suspect and selfserving.
60. The Court does not believe that Mr. Hansen asked Mr. Jennings ifhe had authority to
conduct business on behalf ofVC Holdings, and that Mr. Jennings replied that the Eskelsen's
claims were not valid.
61. This Court does not believe that Mr. Hansen would have done anything to stop the
sale, especially questioning his own authority to act on behalf of VC Holdings by asking Mr.
Jennings for his opinion regarding the same.
62. It was Mr. Hansen who approached Mr. Jennings and offered to sell the Property.
63. The Hansens were desperate for money and a ready source of money was the sale of
VC Holdings interest in NC Leasing. The only way that interest could be sold was if Hansen, as
the manager ofVC Holdings, signed the necessary documents on behalf ofVC Holdings.
64. The Court finds that the Hansens bankruptcy filings (described below) contain
inaccuracies and untruths, and that Mr. Hansen testified falsely under oath in October 2011, at
the 341 Bankruptcy hearing, all of which further convinces the Court that much of Mr.
Hansen's testimony is not believable.
65. The Court finds, on the other_ hand, that Mr. Jennings testimony on this point
believable. He had no reason to give Mr. Hansen legal or business advice regarding the sale of
the property. Mr. Hansen was the party pushing the sale, not Mr. Jennings, and it makes sense
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~

that Mr. Hansen would be giving Mr. Jennings assurances that he was the manager ofVC
Holdings and could act on behalf ofVC Holdings.
66. The Court finds that but for Mr. Hansen's assurances to Mr. Jennings that he could
~

act on behalf ofVC Holdings, Theta would probably not have purchased the Property from VC
Holdings in March of 2011.
67. On March 23, 2011, Mr. Engstrom ordered closing documents from Elwin Prince at
Southern Utah Title Company for a transfer of the 31.8% property interest at issue in this case
from JVC Leasing to VC Holdings and then to Theta Investment Company (hereinafter "Theta
Investment") through a 1031 exchange qualified intermediary. (See Ex. 5).

~

68. On March 29, 2011, Mr. Hansen, acting as Manager ofVC Holdings, signed a

Purchase Agreement agreeing to sell the Property to Theta for $236,337.00. (See Ex. 10).
Cfi

69. On March 29, 2011, Mr. Hansen, signing as Manager ofVC Holdings, executed an
Agreement to Redeem Membership Interest by which VC Holdings exchanged its 31.8%
membership interest for a 31.8% interest in the Property. (See Ex. 39).
70. Pursuant to the Agreement to Redeem Membership Interest, NC Leasing transferred
a 31.8% interest in the Property to VC Holdings. (See Ex. 16).
71. In exchange for the purchase price, VC Holdings transferred its 31.8% interest in the
Property to Theta. (See Ex. 21).
72. The March 29, 2011, transaction took place at the office of Southern Utah Title
Company. (See Tr. vol. II 49:10-12 (Jennings); Tr. vol. I, 117:25 - 118:7 (Hansen); Tr. vol. I,
146:9-12 (Prince)).
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73. On March 29, 2011 the Hansens did not have a personal ownership interest in NC
<i9

Leasing. (See Tr. vol. II, 31:7-14).
74. In exchange for the transfer of JVC Leasing's interest, Theta paid $180,000.00 into
escrow with Southern Utah Title Company, and satisfied the debt Mr. Jennings described in his
letter to Mr. Tobler. (Ex. 20). The $180,000.00 would have satisfied the debt owed by the
Hansens to the Eskelsens.
75. Mr. Hansen testified there was no appraisal of the property interest at the time of
sale, (See Tr. Vol. I, 116:2-6 (Hansen)) and he believed the value was much higher at
approximately $350,000.00. (Id. at 137:8-11) Further, he does not believe the purchase price
was for fair market value. ( Id. at 138: 8-11).
76. Mr. Hansen testified he sold the property interest on March 29, 2011, because he was
"broke." (Id. at 100: 17-20 (Hansen)) Mr. Jennings also testified he knew the Hansens were in
financial trouble. (See Id. at 244:1-2; Vol. II, 5:18 9Jenniings)).
77. Mr. Hansen testified the final sale price was detennined by Mr. Jennings who
exploited his and his wife's poor financial situation, forcing them to sell only to Mr. Jennings or
one of his companies. (See Tr. Vol. l,101:24-102:3(Hansen)) Mr. Hansen testified he had
another opportunity to sell the property for $350,000.00, (Id. at 101 :6-7); however, Mr. Jennings
told him "we will not have any other partner, do you understand what I am saying." (Id. at 102:
8-12). After this conversation Mr. Hansen testified he felt he could not sell to anyone else. (Id.;

~

see also 142:23-143:1, 14-20).
78. At the March 29, 2011, closing Mr. Hansen signed a Waiver and Consent

acknowledging the law firm of Durham Jones & Pinegar did not represent him or VC Holdings
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in the transaction with NC Leasing and/or JENCO, although the firm had represented Mr.
~

Hansen and VC Holdings in other matters. ( See Ex. 55).
79. At the March, 29, 2011, closing Mr. Hansen instructed Southern Utah Title Company
to release the $180,000.00 sale proceeds to a company called ME Jenkins Management, LLC.
(See Exs. 51, 34). Once paid out, Mr. Hansen testified he used the money for personal expenses
and elected not to pay the Eskelsens. (See Tr. Vol. I, 127:6-11, 127:24-128:l (Hansen)). He
stated that he "decided to do something he thought was wrong and kept it for himself." (Id. at
128:8-10).

80. As of March 29, 2011, the Eskelsens had not filed a change with the Utah Division
of Commerce to reflect that they were the owners and managers ofVC Holdings and that the
Hansens were no longer members or managers. (See Ex. 53). Mr. Tobler testified they did not
do this because they were in negotiations with the Hansens and Mr. Jennings and therefore did
not believe it was necessary. (See Tr. Vol.I, 38:20-39:7, 14-25(Tobler)). Further, Mr. Tobler
testified he believed the easiest or most proper way to change the website would be to get a
resolution reflecting the change from the Hansens. (Id at 128:8-10).
81. Mr. Tobler testified that neither he nor the Eskelsens had any knowledge of the
~

March 29, 2011, transaction. In fact, on May 4, 2011, he contacted Mr. Blanchard to inquire the
status of the parties and the escrow agreement. (Id. at 41: 2-10). At that time he said Mr.
Blanchard informed him that he had not had contact with Mr. Hansen for a very long time and
because of that there would be no agreement between the parties. ( Id. 35: 2-36:7). Mr.
Blanchard also told Mr. Tobler he was free to contact or otherwise pursue the Hansens. (Id.).
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82. Mr. Tobler further testified that other than Mr. Blanchard, no other attorneys from
Durham Jones & Pinegar or Mr. Jennings contacted him between January and March. (Id. at 36:
19-22).
83. After May 4, 2011,The Eskelsens unsuccessfully attempted to locate the Hansens.
(Id. at 37: 4-16). They even hired a process server to try to find them still with no success. (Id.}
84. In August of 2011, the Eskelsens received notice of the Hansens' Ch. 7 bankruptcy
filing. (See Ex. 29: Tr. Vol. I, 40:14-17 Tobler)). On the same day they received the bankruptcy
notice, Mr. Tobler testified he searched the Washington County, Utah, Recorder's Office website
and first discovered the March 29, 2011, transfer documents. (Id. at 41 :2-10).
85. Mr. Tobler reviewed the Hansens' bankruptcy schedules and discovered that the
Eskelsens were listed as unsecured creditors. (See Tr. vol. I, 59: 9-16 (Tobler), 130: 11-17
(Hansen); see also Trial Exhibit 29 pp. 9, 16).
86. Hansens bankruptcy schedules did not list any interest in businesses.

(See Ex. 29 p. 5).
87. Hansens bankruptcy schedules did not list any transfer of property from Hansen to
the Eskelsens or anyone else. (See Ex. 29 p. 34).
88. The Eskelsens did not file any objections to any documents filed in the Hansens'
bankruptcy case. (See Tr. Vol. I, 58: 13-15 (Tobler)).
89. A 341 meeting of creditors was held in October of 2011. (See Ex. 30). The
0J

Eskelsens and Mr. Tobler attended to ask questions about the March 29, 2011, transaction. Id.;
Tr. Vol. I, 42:12-20 (Tobler)). At the meeting, the bankruptcy trustee, David West, asked
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questions first and specifically asked about the property interest and the transaction. (Id. at 43 :921 ). The Eskelsens, then asked several more questions about the transaction. (Id. at 42:12-20).
90. At the Hansens bankruptcy meeting of Creditors, Hansen did not tell the bankruptcy
Trustee about the $180,000.00 he received from VC Holdings/ME. Jenkins at the March 29,
2011 closing, and he falsely informed the Trustee that he only received forgiveness of debt. (See
Tr. Vol. I, 129:5-16 (Hansen), 59:4-6 (Tobler)).
~

91. The Hansens received a bankruptcy discharge in December of 2011. (See Ex. 31).
However, only Chad Eskelsen, not Loma Eskelsen, was listed as a creditor in the bankruptcy.
(See Ex. 29).
92. Shortly thereafter Mr. Tobler, contacted the Utah Department of Commerce about
changing the state's website to reflect the change in managers ofVC Holdings. (See Tr. Vol.
40:7-13). He was told Utah is a good faith filing state, meaning he could just simply change the
information without any formality. (Id.). This change was accomplished on February 29, 2012.
(See Ex. 38).
93. The Eskelsens did not file any objection to Hansen's bankruptcy discharge. (See Tr.
Vol. I, 58:17-19 (Tobler)).
94. The Eskelsens thereafter filed this lawsuit on June 29, 2012, and on the same date
filed a Notice of Lis Pendens on the property. The Court notes that the Eskelsens named their
own Company (VC Holdings) as a Defendant in this action.
95. VC Holdings did not file an Answer to the Eskelsens' complaint. But Plaintiff's
counsel filed an answer on behalf ofVC Holdings to Theta's cross complaint. It did not
otherwise participate or present a defense at trial.
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97. The Hansens were served with the Complaint and Cross Claim in this case, but they
did not file any response.
Based on the above Findings the Court now enters the following:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Hansens failed to answer the Plaintiffs' Complaint and Theta's cross claim, and
are in default, but any facts established against the Hansens by default are not binding and are not

deemed admitted as against Theta or the Eskelsens. 1 The Court will sign a separate judgment
regarding the same.

I. THE MARCH 29, 2011 TRANSFER WAS NOT A FRAUDULENT TRANSFER.
2. The Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that VC Holdings is the lawful owner of
31.8% of the Property. The first legal theory advanced in the Plaintiffs complaint is that the
¼)!)

transfer of the Property from VC Holdings to Theta on March 29, 2011 was a fraudulent transfer
under the Utah Fraudulent Transfer Act ("the Act").
3. In order to prevail on a fraudulent transfer theory the Plaintiffs must establish that they

are "Creditors" and that the Hansens and/or VC Holdings are "Debtors".
4. There is no issue that the Hansens are "Debtors" under the Act. The Hansens
individually borrowed $120,000.00 from the Eskelsens. Thus a Debtor/Creditor relationship was
established.

See Speros v. Fricke, 2004 UT 69 ,r 49; Dade County v. Lambert, 334 So. 2d 844,847 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1976); Chromacolour Labs, Inc. v. Snider Bros. Prop. Mgmt. Inc., 503 A.2d 1365, 1369-70 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1986); Rogers v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., 649 N.W.2d 23, 27~28 (Mich. 2002); Archacki v.
Regional Transit Authority, 455 N.E.2d 1285, 1286 (Ohio 1983) (per curiam); Stillwell v. City of
Wheeling, 558 S.E.2d 598, 606-07 (W. Va. 2001).
1
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5. The situation with VC Holdings, however, is di~erent. VC Holdings was not a party
to the Eskelsen/Hansen loan. VC Holdings did not owe a debt to the Eskelsens and is therefore
not a "Debtor" as defined by the Act. Therefore, The Eskelsens' fraudulent transfer claims

,_

against VC Holdings fails.
6. As to the Hansens, the Eskelsens must also establish that the Hansens made a transfer
with either" (a) actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud [the Eskelsens] "or "(b) without

~

receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer, ... etc. Paraphrasing Utah
Code§ 25-6-5(1).

7. NC Leasing was the owner of the Property, not the Hansens. VC Holdings owned an
interest in NC Leasing, and its (VC Holdings) interest in JVC Leasing was transferred at the
March 29, 2011 closing. Because the Hansens did not own an interest in NC Leasing, they
could not and did not transfer any interest in JVC Leasing at the March 29, 2015 closing.
Therefore the Eskelsens' Fraudulent Transfer claims against the Hansens fail.

8. Even if the Hansens and VC Holdings interests can somehow be melded together so as
to become a "Debtor" Plaintiffs claims fails because they provided no evidence that VC
Holdings did not receive a "reasonably equivalent value " in exchange for the transfer" UCA Sec.
25-6-5(1).
~

9. VC Holdings received $236,337 from Theta in exchange for VC Holdings ownership
interest in JVC Leasing. Mr, Hansen opined that VC Holding's interest in JVC Leasing was worth
~

more than the $236,337.00. However, Mr. Hansen was not an owner or member of NC Leasing at
the time of the sale, and not being qualified as an expert regarding the value of limited liability
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company ownership interests, his opinion is suspect, and this Court gives no weight to his
testimony regarding value.
10. The Eskelsens' offered no other proof (such as an expert) to establish the fair market
value of the 31.8% ownership interest in JVC Leasing's at the time of transfer.

They have failed

to establish an element required under the Act, and their cause of action fails. See Utah Code § 256-5(1).
~

11. Based on the above analysis, the Court has no need to further consider the parties other
arguments regarding Act.

II. MR. HANSEN WAS THE MANAGER OF VC HOLDINGS ON MARCH 29, 2011.
12. The Plaintiffs second argument in support of their request for a declaratory judgment is
that Hansen lacked the authority to sign the closing documents on behalf of VC Holdings on March
29,2011.
13. The Eskelsen's claim that after the Hansens default, they properly foreclosed on the
Hansens member interests in VC Holdings pursuant to Utah Code§ 70A-9a-620. The Court agrees.
The security agreement (Ex. 2) was properly foreclosed and the Eskelsens obtained the ownership
interests ofVC Holdings.
14. The Eskelsens assert that when they obtained the ownership interests ofVC
Holdings, they removed the Hansens as managers and placed themselves in that position. From that
time on (sometime towards the end of January 2011) they claim the Hansens were no longer
managers ofVC Holdings and could not act on behalf of the company. (See Exs. 17 &18). The
Court disagrees with this assertion.
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15. As set forth below the Court concludes that even though the Eskelsens obtained VC
®

Holdings membership interests through foreclosure they did not become Managers of the Company
until long after the March 29, 2011 closing.
16. A limited liability company is a separate entity managed by its members and/or
managers pursuant to an Operating Agreement. VC Holdings Operating Agreement (Ex. 40) sets
forth how the company will be owned, operated and managed.
17. Article 3 of the Operating Agreement sets forth the manner of acting of it's members.

"

18. The Eskelsens did not comply with Article 3 by ever calling or holding a members
meeting setting forth their membership interests in the Company prior to the March 29, 2011 closing.
No minutes showing such meetings were ever produced.

No such written Resolutions were

produced.
19. Section 3 .4 Limitation on Individual Authority. of Article 3 states in pertinent part as
follows: "A Member who is not also a Manager has no authority to bind the Company."
20. Article 5 of the Operating Agreement describes Management of the Company and the
manner of acting of its managers. The Eskelsens did not comply with Article 5 by holding a
management meeting to vote themselves in as Managers, nor did they vote Mr. Hansen out as
Manager. No minutes showing such meetings were ever produced.

No such written Resolutions

were produced.
21. The Court concludes that when the Foreclosure letter (Ex. 17) was written the
Eskelsens were not Managers of the Company and as members only they had no authority to bind
the Company.
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22. Article: 8.1 (a) Required Amendments of the Operating Agreement also has bearing
on this issue. It specifically states: "The Company, the Manager and the Members will execute and
file with the Division a certificate of amendment of the Articles when... (6) there is a change in the
identity of any Manager.... " (See Ex. 40)
23. The Eskelsens failed to file this required amendment with the Division showing that
they were now Managers of the Company prior March 29, 2015. This further supports the Courts
conclusion that they were not Managers at the time the Property was transferred.

24. It is unclear whether the Eskelsens had a copy of the Operating Agreement prior to the
March 29, 2011 closing date. 2 Whether the Eskelsens' did or did not have a copy of the Operating
agreement while not crucial, emphasizes the Court's conclusion that while they had properly
~

foreclosed on their security interest in the membership interests ofVC Holdings, they had not taken
control of the Company by the closing date.
25. During the January and February 2011 discussions between Mr. Blanchard and Mr.
Tobler, Mr. Blanchard indicated that the Hansens did not believe that the Eskelsens had properly
foreclosed the Hansens membership interest in VC Holdings. Based on the Hansens skepticism, the

~

Eskelsens were put on notice that they needed to take furhter corporate steps to show that they were
in control of the Company.

There are any number of things they could have done including having

a documented member meeting where they removed the Hansens as Managers; voted themselves in
as new managers; and, if they did not have access to the Operating Agreement they could have
2

~

The Foreclosure Letter (Ex. 17) does, however, refer to paragraph 5.lO(c) of the Operating
Agreement.
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created and approved a whole new Operating Agreement. They also should have updated the state
records to put the world on notice that they were now the members and managers ofVC Holdings.
~

26. The Eskelsens argue that updating the Utah Division of Commerce website to show
that Mr. Hansen had been removed as Manager, and showing the Eskelsens as the new Managers
would somehow not be reliable because Utah is a good faith filing state, meaning virtually anything
can be filed by anyone at any time. That argument, however, does not excuse them from filing
amended Articles, "showing a change in the identity of the Managers" pursuant to paragraph 8. l(a)
of the Operating Agreement. Furthermore, had they updated the Division's website prior to March
29, 2015, that simple act, in and of itself, would probably have obviated the need for this trial.
27. Updating the Division's website would have provided part of the additional proof that

~

Mr. Jennings requested in his January 4, 2011 letter to Mr. Tobler. (Ex20). Mr. Jennings testified
that after receiving Mr. Tobler's December 27,201 I letter (Ex. 18) he checked the Divisions
website, and found that Mr. Hansen was listed as Manager.

0P
28. Furthermore, such an update would also have put Southern Utah Title on notice that
the Eskelsens claimed that Mr. Hansen was no longer the Manager ofVC Holdings.
~

Southern

Utah Title Company searched that website in preparation for the March 29, 2011 closing, and found
that Mr. Hansen was listed as the Manager ofVC Holdings. If its search instead found that Mr.
Hansen was no longer listed as manager ofVC Holdings, Southern Utah Title would have notified
counsel for the Jennings and Mr. Hansen of it's web search, which this Court believes would have
also stopped the closing until the Eskelsens claims had been resolved.
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29. Because the Eskelsens, as new members ofVC Holdings, did not properly remove

Mr. Hansen as the manager ofVC Holdings; did not file a certificate of amendment pursuant to
@

paragraph 8.l(a) of the Operating Agreement; and, did not update the Division's website prior to the
March 29, 2011 closing, the Court concludes that Mr. Hansen, not the Eskelsens, was the Manager
of VC Holdings on March 29, 2011.

III. HANSENS ACTIONS AS MANAGER BINDS VC HOLDINGS
30. The Plaintiffs also claim that the March 29, 2011 transfers were voidable because
Hansen lacked the required authority to sign the closing documents.
31. Theta argues this claim fails if Theta was a bona fide purchaser. The Eskelsens
respond that Mr. Jennings was on inquiry notice and therefore Theta could not be bonafide
purchaser.
32. A bona fide purchaser is one who pays valuable consideration for a conveyance, acts
in good faith, and takes without notice of an adverse claim of others' 9utstanding rights to the
seller's title. Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188, 1197 (Utah 1993).
33. The Eskelsens cite the Court to the following case law defining inquiry notice. See
\:ID

Universal C.I.T. Cor_p. v. Courtesy Motors. Inc., 333 P.2d 628, 629 (1959) ("Whatever is notice
enough to excite attention and put the party on his guard and call for inquiry is notice of everything
to which such inquiry might have led. When a person has sufficient information to lead him to a
fact, he shall be deemed conversant of it."); and O'Reilly v. McLean, 37 P.2d 770, 775 (1934)
("Having sufficient information to put it upon inquiry, it was intervener's duty to make such
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investigation and it is charged with the knowledge which it would have thus obtained."); Pender v.
Dowse, 265 P.2d 644,649 (1954) ("Moreover, the inquiry must be made at a reliable source from
which the true state of facts will. be naturally disclosed; it is not sufficient that the purchaser make an
inquiry of a person when he knows that it is to such person's interest to misrepresent or conceal the
existence of the outstanding interest, and that such person does deny its existence."); see also Meyer
v. Gen. Am. Cor.p., 569 P.2d 1094, 1097 (Utah 1977) ("It is notice, not knowledge, that the
purchaser must have, and it need not be actual notice constructive notice is sufficient to defeat the
Gj

purchaser's claim. Constructive notice can occur when circumstances arise that should put a
reasonable person on guard so as to require further inquiry on his part.").
34. The Court concludes that Mr. Jennings was put on notice of the Eskelsens claims upon

@

receipt of Mr. Tobleres December 27, 2010 letter. (Ex. 18), and that he had a duty to inquire about
the Eskelsens claims. The Court further concludes that Mr. Jennings did conduct a reasonable
inquiry into the Eskelsens claims. This conclusion is based on the following;

a.

Immediately upon receipt of Mr. Tobler's December 27, 2010 letter (Ex. 20) Mr.
Jennings wrote back to Mr. Tobler and asked for "documentary proof of the
transition of ownership." (See Ex. 20). The Eskelsens never responded to that
request.

b.

Mr. Jennings also asked Mr. Hansen about the Eskelsens claims and Mr. Hansen
told Mr. Jennings that he had authority to sign for VC Holdings;

c.

Mr. Jennings also researched the Commerce Divisions web site which listed
Mr. Hansen as Manager for VC Holdings. That information supported Mr.
Hansen's assertions that Mr. Hansen was the Manager ofVC Holdings;

d.

Theta conducted the closing at Southern Utah Title Company and obtained a title

Page 24 of 28

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

commitment that did not show any encumbrances to NC Leasings interest in the
Property.

e.

Mr. Jennings relied on representations and documents signed by Vaughn Hansen
to determine that Hansen had authority to execute the closing documents.

f.

Mr. Jennings relied on Southern Utah Title Company's determination that
Vaughn Hansen had authority to execute the closing documents.

g.

Theta Investment Company paid sufficient value to VC Holdings for Hansen to
pay his debts.

h.

Jennings and Troy Blanchard separately believed that Hansen intended to pay the
debts he had.

1.

~

At one point there was a understanding that any proceeds received by VC
Holdings from the sale or distribution of or from NC Leasing would be
escrowed for the benefit of the Eskelsens, and that Mr. Blanchard would prepare
an escrow agreement to that effect. If Mr. Jennings is deemed to know what Mr.
Blanchard knew, he would know that Mr. Blanchard contacted Mr. Tobler in
March and informed him (Mr. Tobler) that Mr. Hansen wanted to work directly
with the Eskelsens and that he (Mr. Blanchard) would not be preparing an escrow
agreement. (See Findings 44 &45 supra).

35. The Eskelsens argue that even though Mr. Jennings had not heard back from the
Eskelsens after he requested proof of their claims he should have contacted them again, a second
time, to ask for the information he had requested on January 7, 2011. The Court disagrees with that
argument. The ball, so to speak, was in the Eskelsens court and they had the duty to provide the
infonnation Mr. Jennings had requested some three months before the March 29, 2011 closing.
36. This Court has already concluded that Mr. Hansen was the Manager ofVC Holdings

on March 29, 2011. There is, however, an issue as to whether or not he exceeded his authority when
he signed the March 29, 2011 closing documents on behalf of VC Holdings.
viP
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37. An act of a manager, including the signing of a docwnent in the company name, for
apparently carrying on in the ordinary course of the company business, ... binds the company unless
~

the manager had no authority to act for the company in the particular matter and the lack of
authority was expressly described in the articles of organization or the person with whom the
manager was dealing knew or otherwise had notice that the manager lacked authority. UTAH

CooEANN. § 48-2c-802(2)(c) (LexisNexis 2010). 3 (Emphasis added).
38. VC Holdings Articles of Organization contains no express language limiting Mr.
Hansen's authority, as Manager, to transfer VC Holdings assets. (See Ex. 26).
39. Paragraph 5.4 ofVC Holdings Operating Agreement (Ex. 40), however, contains the
following prohibition:
5.4 Required Member Anproval. Notwithstanding any other provision of this
Agreement, without the approval of Members whose aggregate Membership interest in
at least 51 percent, the Managers may take no action with respect to: the sale, lease,
exchange, mortgage, pledge or other disposition of all or substantially all of the
Company's assets; ...
40. The issue then is whether Mr. Jennings knew that Mr. Hansen had to have VC
Holding's members approval before participating in the March 29, 2011 closing.
41. Plaintiff's presented no evidence at trial regarding this issue and the Court concludes
3

As noted in Zions Gate R. V. Resort, LLC v. Oliphant, 326 P.3d 118, 122 -123 (Utah App. 2014), "Apparent
authority exists where the conduct of the principal causes a third party to reasonably believe that someone has
authority to act on the principal's behalf, and the third party relies on this appearance of authority and will suffer loss
if an agency relationship is not found." Hale v. Big H Constr., Inc., 2012 UT App 283, ,r 64,288 P.3d 1046.
However, "(k]now ]edge of an agent's lack of authority defeats a claim for apparent authority."Horroc!GY v. Westfalia
Systemat, 892 P.2d 14, 16 n. 1 (Utah Ct.App.1995) (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency§ 166 (1958) ("A person
with notice of a limitation of an agent's authority cannot subject the principal to liability upon a transaction with the
agent ifhe should know that the agent is acting improperly.")).
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that the Mr. Jennings had no knowledge thereof.
42. Paragraph 5.5 of the Operating Agreement supports this conclusion. It states as
follows:

5.5 Agency Power and Authority. A Manager apparently acting for the Company in the
usual course of its business has the power to bind the Company and no person has an
obligation to inquire into the Manager's actual authority to act on the Company's
behalf. However, if a Manager acts outside the scope of the Manager's actual authority,
the Manager will indemnify the Company for and costs of damages it incurs as a result of
the unauthorized act. (Emphasis added).
43. The Hansens both signed a Resolution of Members authorizing the sale ofVC Holding's
interest in its ownership interest in NC Leasing. (See Ex. 51).

44. Even though the Hansen's were not members ofVC Holdings on March 29, 2011, no
evidence was produced at trial that Mr. Jennings was aware of that fact. And because Mr. Jennings
had known and done business with Mr. Hansens, and VC Holdings for years, the Court concludes
{.@

that Mr. Jennings had no obligation to make further inquires regarding member approval as to Mr.
Hansen's authority as manager to act for VC Holdings at the March 29, 2011 closing.

45. The Court concludes that because Mr. Hansen was the Manager ofVC Holdings, and that
Theta was a Bonafide Purchaser for Value on March 29, 2011, the Eskelsens claim that Mr. Hansen
lacked authority on March 29, 2011, to act on behalf ofVC Holdings fails.
46. Based on the above analysis the Court has no need to address the other arguments made
by the parties at trial.
47. Judgment should issue in favor of Theta, and the Lis Pendens recorded by the Eskelsens
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on the Property as part of this litigation should immediately be released.
~

Dated this

f

J T'k day of May, 2015.
BY THE COURT

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law to be placed in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, on this 4::2} day of May,
2015 to the following:
Vaughn Hansen and Carolyn Hansen
2615 W Highway 89
Mount Carmel, UT 84775
(iJ

and e-mailed to the following:
Daniel J. Tobler
Attorney for Chad and Lorna Eskelsen and
VC Holdings, LLC
dtobler@slemboski-law.com
Bryan J. Pattison
John R. Berger
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimant
Theta Investment Company
bpattison@djplaw.com
jberger@djplaw.com
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By ___ ···-·-· ••·w-•-

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASIDNGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CHAD ESKELSEN and
LORNA ESKELSEN
~

Plaintiffs,

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

v.
VAUGHN L. HANSEN; CAROLYN S.
HANSEN; VC HOLDINGS, LLC; THETA
INVESTMENT COMPANY

Trial Dates: March 30 & 31
(Bench Trial)

THETA INVESTMENT COMPANY,
Counter and Cross Claimant,

Case No. 120500400

V.

CHAD ESKELSEN and

Judge Jeffrey C. Wilcox

LORNA ESKELSEN
Counterclaim Defendants,
VC HOLDINGS, LLC and VAUGHN
HANSEN
Cross-claim Defendants
~
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Plaintiffs Chad and Loma Eskelsen and Defendant Theta Investment Company appeared
at a two day trial on March 30 and 31 of 2015. The Court, having considered, observed, listened
to and reviewed all admissible evidence and testimony and having entered its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, now ORDERS, ADJUDGES, and DECREES as follows:
1.

The Plaintiffs' Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.

2.

Chad and Loma Eskelsen do not own any interest in the real property described as

follows (the "Property"):
Tax I.D. No. SG-5-3-20-424-CD
An undivided 31.8% interest in and to the following described property:

Beginning at a point North 88°45' 10'MBOLI 62\f'Symbol"\s12 West, 3433.02 feet
along the Center Section line and North 00°00'00" East, 45.01 feet from the West
Quarter Comer of Section 21, Township 43 South, Range 15 West, Salt Lake Base
and Meridian and running thence North 88°45'10" West, 374.79 feet; thence North
14°54'13" East, 430.91 feet to the point of a 45.00 feet radius curve to the right;
thence Northeasterly through a central angle of 90°00'00" and along the arc of said
curve 70.69 feet; thence South 75°05'47" East, 195.36 feet to the point of a 660.00
foot radius curve to the right; thence Southeasterly through a central angle of
15°08'27" and along the arc of said curve 174.41 feet; thence South 59°57'20" East,
48.34 feet; thence South 30°02'40" West, 364.54 feet to the point of beginning.
(Proposed Lot 158 FORT PIERCE INDUSTRIAL PARK)
3.

VC Holdings, LLC has no right, title, interest in, or claim to the Property.

4.

The Plaintiffs shall immediately remove any and all encumbrances each or both of

them placed on the Property, including the Notice of Lis Pendens recorded against the property

0P

on June 29, 2012 as entry number 20120021538.

5.

Pursuant to URCP Rule 54 Theta Investment Company is entitled to costs
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incurred in defending this action.
Dated this 11th day of May, 2015.

BY THE COURT

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

o,

I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoin~ginent and Order
to be placed in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, on this
day of J
2015
to the following:

{/;l

Vaughn Hansen and Carolyn Hansen
2615 W Highway 89
Mount Carmel, UT 84775
and e-mailed to the following:
Daniel J. Tobler
Attorney for Chad and Lorna Eskelsen and
VC Holdings, LLC
dtobler@slemboski-law.com

Bryan J. Pattison
John R. Berger
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimant
Theta Investment Company
bpattison@djplaw.com
jberger@djplaw.com

Page 3 of 3

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ADDENDUM
3

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

SLEMBOSKI & TOBLER
DANIEL J. TOBLER #12695
Attorney for Plaintiffs
32 East 100 South, Suite 203
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone: (435) 628-1435
Facsimile: (435) 628-1489
Email: dtobler@slemboskilaw.com

IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
~

CHAD ESKELSEN and LORNA
ESKELSEN,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
VAUGHNL. HANSEN;
CAROLYN S. HANSEN;
VC HOLDINGS, LLC, a Utah Limited
Liability Company; and
THETA INVESTMENT COMPANY, a
Utah Corporation.

ORDER ON MOTION TO
AMEND AND MAKE
ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF
FACT and MOTION TO
EXTEND TIME TO SERVE
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS ON
PLAINTIFFS

Defendants.
THETA INVESTMENT COMPANY,
Counter- and Cross
Claimant,
V.

CHAD ESKELSEN and LORNA
ESKELSEN,
Counterclaim
Defendants,
VC HOLDINGS, LLC and VAUGHN
HANSEN,
Cross- claim Defendants.

Civil No. 120500400
Judge Jeffrey C. Wilcox
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This matter came before the above-titled Court on October 16, 2015,
on Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend and Make Additional Findings of Fact as well as
Defendant Theta Investment Company's Motion to Extend Time to Serve
Memorandum of Costs on Plaintiffs. Counsel for the Plaintiffs, Daniel J. Tobler,
and counsel for the Defendant Theta Investment Company, John R. Berger, was
present.
After reviewing the motions and hearing argument from counsel,
and good cause appearing therefore, the Court now makes and enters its Order on
Motion to Amend and Make Additional Findings of Fact and Motion to Extend
Time to Serve Memorandum of Costs on Plaintiffs as follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED as

follows:
1.

The Plaintiffs' Motion to Amend and Make Additional

Findings of Fact is hereby granted in part and denied in part.
2.

Paragraph 51 of the Findings of Fact shall be amended to

replace the word "Theta" with "JENCO."
3.

Paragraphs 7 and 23 of the Conclusions of Law shall be

amended to replace "2015" with "2011."
4.

Except as stated herein, the Plaintiff's motion is otherwise
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denied.
5.

The Defendant Theta Investment Company's Motion to

Extend Time to Serve Memorandum of Costs on Plaintiffs is hereby denied.

- - - - - - - - - - E N D OF O R D E R - - - - - - The Court Official's Signature Appears at the Top Right of the First Page.
NOTICE
The foregoing ORDER ON MOTION TO AMEND AND MAKE

ADDITIONAL FINDINGS OF FACT and MOTION TO EXTEND TIME
TO SERVE MEMORANDUM OF COSTS ON PLAINTIFFS has been
submitted to the Court for execution and entry. Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure allows seven (7) days following service for the opposing party to
submit notice of objection. If such objection, as to form, is not received within the
subscribed time period, said Order will be executed by the Court.
DATED this 261h day of August, 2016.

Isl Daniel J. Tobler
DANIEL J. TOBLER
Attorney for Plaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING AND ELECTRONIC FILING
I do hereby certify that on the 26th day of August, 2016, I did
personally place in the U. S. Mail, postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDER ON MOTION TO AMEND AND MAKE ADDITIONAL
FINDINGS OF FACT and MOTION TO EXTEND TIME TO SERVE
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS ON PLAINTIFFS in the above-titled case, to
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the following:
Vaughn Hansen and Carolyn Hansen
2615 West Hwy 89
Mount Carmel, Utah 84 77 5
and the same was electronically filed and thereby served to the following:
John R. Berger
Durham Jones & Pinegar, P.C.
Attorney for Theta Investment Company

Isl Daniel J. Tobler
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Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-6-2 -- Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act -- Definitions.
In this chapter:
(1) "Affiliate" means:
(a) a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 20% or
more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other than a person who holds the
securities:
(i) as a fiduciary or agent without sole discretionary power to vote the securities; or
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if the person has not exercised the power to vote;

(b) a corporation 20% or more of whose outstanding voting securities are directly or
indirectly owned, controlled, or held with power to vote, by the debtor or a person who
directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds, with power to vote, 20% or more of the
outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other than a person who holds the securities:
(i) as a fiduciary or agent without sole power to vote the securities; or
(ii) solely to secure a debt, if the person has not exercised the power to vote;
( c) a person whose business is operated by the debtor under a lease or other agreement, or a
person substantially all of whose assets are controlled by the debtor; or
(d) a person who operates the debtor's business under a lease or other agreement or controls
substantially all of the debtor's assets.
(2) "Asset" means property of a debtor, but does not include:
(a) property to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien;
(b) property to the extent it is generally exempt under nonbankruptcy law; or
(c) an interest in property held in tenancy by the entireties to the extent it is not subject to
process by a creditor holding a claim against only one tenant.
(3) "Claim" means a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment,
liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal,
equitable, secured, or unsecured.
(4) "Creditor" means a person who has a claim.
(5) "Debt" means liability on a claim.
(6) "Debtor" means a person who is liable on a claim.
(7) "Insider" includes:
(a) if the debtor is an individual:
(i) relative of the debtor or of a general partner of the debtor;

a

(ii) a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(iii) a general partner in a partnership described in Subsection (7)(a)(ii);
(iv) a corporation of which the debtor i~ a director, officer, or person in control; or
(v) a limited liability company of which the debtor is a member or manager;
(b) if the debtor is a corporation:
(i) a director of the debtor;
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(ii) an officer of the debtor;
(iii) a person in control of the debtor;
(iv) a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(v) a general partner in a partnership described in Subsection (7)(b)(iv);
(vi) a limited liability company of which the debtor is a member or manager; or
(vii) a relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person in control of the debtor;
(c) if the debtor is a partnership:
(i) a general partner in the debtor;
(ii) a relative of a general partner in, a general partner of, or a person in control of the
debtor;

(iii) another partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(iv) a general partner in a partnership described in Subsection (7)(c)(iii);
(v) a limited liability company of which the debtor is a member or manager; or
(vi) a person in control of the debtor;
(d) if the debtor is a limited liability company:
(i) a member or manager of the debtor;
(ii) another limited liability company in which the debtor is a member or manager;
(iii) a partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(iv) a general partner in a partnership described in Subsection (7)(d)(iii);
(v) a person in control of the debtor; or
(vi) a relative of a general partner, member, manager, or person in control of the debtor;
f'.,'.,.111

w

(e) an affiliate, or an insider of an affiliate as if the affiliate were the debtor; and
(f) a managing agent of the debtor.

(8) "Lien" means a charge against or an interest in property to secure payment of a debt or
performance of an obligation, and includes a security interest created by agreement, a judicial
lien obtained by legal or equitable process or proceedings, a common-law lien, or a statutory
lien.
(9) "Person" means an individual, partnership, limited liability company, corporation,
association, organization, government or governmental subdivision or agency, business trust,
estate, trust, or any other legal or commercial entity.
(10) "Property" means anything that may be the subject of ownership.
(11) "Relative" means an individual or an individual related to a spouse, related by consanguinity
within the third degree as determined by the common law, or a spouse, and includes an
individual in an adoptive relationship within the third degree.
(12) "Transfer" means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, or voluntary or
involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and includes
payment of money, release, lease, and creation of a lien or other encumbrance.
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(13) "Valid lien" means a lien that is effective against the holder of a judicial lien subsequently
obtained by legal or equitable process or proceedings.
Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-6-5 -- Fraudulent transfer -- Claim arising before or after transfer.
( 1) A transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the
creditor's claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred, if
the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation:
(a) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor; or
(b) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or

obligation; and the debtor:
(i) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the
remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the business or
transaction; or
(ii) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that he would
incur, debts beyond his ability to pay as they became due.
(2) To detennine "actual intent" under Subsection (l)(a), consideration may be given, among
other factors, to whether:
(a) the transfer or obligation was to an insider;
(b) the debtor retained possession or control of the property transferred after the transfer;

(c) the transfer or obligation was disclosed or concealed;
(d) before the transfer was made or obligation was incurred, the debtor had been sued or
threatened with suit;
(e) the transfer was of substantially all the debtor's assets;
(f) the debtor absconded;

(g) the debtor removed or concealed assets;
(h) the value of the consideration received by the debtor was reasonably equivalent to the
value of the asset transferred or the amount of the obligation incurred;
(i) the debtor was insolvent or became insolvent shortly after the transfer was made or the
obligation was incurred;
G) the transfer occurred shortly before or shortly after a substantial debt was incurred; and

(k) the debtor transferred the essential assets of the business to a lienor who transferred the
assets to an insider of the debtor.
Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-6-9 -- Good faith transfer.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a transfer or obligation is not voidable under
Subsection 25-6-5(l)(a) against a person who took in good faith and for a reasonably
equivalent value or against any subsequent transferee or obligee.

(2) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent a transfer is voidable in an action
by a creditor under Subsection 25-6-8( 1)(a), the creditor may recover judgment for the value
of the asset transferred, as adjusted under Subsection (3), or the amount necessary to satisfy
3
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the creditor's claim, whichever is less. The judgment may be entered against:
(a) the first transferee of the asset or the person for whose benefit the transfer was made; or
(b) any subsequent transferee other than a good faith transferee who took for value or from
any subsequent transferee.
(3) If the judgment under Subsection (2) is based upon the value of the asset transferred, the
judgment shall be for an amount equal to the value of the asset at the time of the transfer,
subject to an adjustment as equities may require.
(4) Except as otherwise provided in this section, notwithstanding the voidability of a transfer or
an obligation under this chapter, a good-faith transferee or obligee is entitled, to the extent of
the value given the debtor for the transfer or obligation, to:
(a) a lien on or a right to retain any interest in the asset transferred;
(b) enforcement of any obligation incurred; or
(c) a reduction in the amount of the liability on the judgment.
(5) A transfer is not voidable under Subsection 25-6-5(1)(b) or Section 25-6-6 if the transfer
results from:
(a) termination of a lease upon default by the debtor when the termination is pursuant to the
lease and applicable law; or
(b) enforcement of a security interest in compliance with Title 70A, Chapter 9a, Uniform
Commercial Code - Secured Transactions.
(6) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a transfer is not voidable under Subsection 25-66(2):
(a) to the extent the insider gave new value to or for the benefit of the debtor after the
transfer was made unless the new value was secured by a valid lien;
(b) if made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the
insider; or
(c) if made pursuant to a good-faith effort to rehabilitate the debtor and the transfer secured
present value given for that purpose as well as an antecedent debt of the debtor.
(7) Notwithstanding the foregoing, a transfer is not voidable under Section 25-6-5 or Subsection

25-6-6(1) if:
(a) the transfer was made by the debtor:
(i) in payment of or in exchange for goods, services, or other consideration obtained by
the debtor or a third party from a merchant in the ordinary course of the merchant's
business; or
(ii) in payment of amounts loaned or advanced by a merchant or a credit or financing
company to pay for the goods, services, or other consideration obtained by the
debtor or a third party from a merchant in the ordinary course of the merchant's
business;
(b) the goods, services, or other consideration obtained from the merchant or the amounts
loaned or advanced by the merchant or the credit or financing company in payment of
the goods, services, or other consideration obtained from the merchant in the ordinary
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course of the merchant's business was of a reasonably equivalent value to the transfer, as
provided in Subsection (8); and
(c) the transferee received the transfer in good faith, in the ordinary course of the transferee's
business, and without actual knowledge that:
(i) the transfer was made by the debtor with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud
any creditor of the debtor; or
(ii) that the debtor was insolvent at the time the transfer was made.
(8) For purposes of Subsection (7):
(a) the tenn "merchant" means the same as that tennis defined in Section ?0A-2-104;
(b) where the value of the goods, services, or other consideration obtained from the
merchant, or where the value of the amounts loaned or advanced by a merchant or a
credit or financing company in payment of the goods, services, or other consideration
obtained from the merchant, was reasonably equivalent to the value of the transfer, the
"reasonably equivalent value" requirement in Subsection (7)(b) will be satisfied
regardless of whether the debtor or a third party received the reasonably equivalent value
for the transfer; and
(c) a transferee's receipt of payment from a debtor is not, and may not be used as, evidence
that:
(i) the transferee did not act in good faith;

(ii) the goods, services, or other consideration were not provided by the merchant in the
ordinary course of the merchant's business;
(iii) the transferee had actual knowledge that the transfer was made by the debtor with
actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor; or
(iv) the debtor was insolvent at the time the transfer was made.
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